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INTRODUCTION: ABORTION AND LIBERALISM

A. The Three Abortion Opinions
In 1973, in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,' the United States

Supreme Court struck down a restrictive abortion law that was typical of
those in most states. Two years later the West German Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtor BVerfG) struck down, by a vote of
six to two, part of a national liberalized abortion law.2 The decisions of
both high courts were controversial; Roe v. Wade by making abortion a
right, the German decision by insisting that abortion is a crime.3 The

controversy surrounding these two decisions extended beyond the problem of abortion. Perhaps more than any other issue in either the United
States or West Germany, these abortion decisions ignited heated debate

on the appropriate nature of judicial review in a constitutional democracy. The reason that the debate about judicial review in general has
become so closely linked to the problem of abortion in particular is that

the problem of abortion exposes tensions at the heart of liberalism.4
The comparison here will be among three opinions: first, the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade; second, the German majority opinion; and
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 1 (1975).
3. Previous comparisons of Roe v. Wade and the German abortion decisions are Gerstein
& Lowry, Abortion, Abstract Norms and Social Control. The Decision of the West German
FederalConstitutionalCourt, 25 EMORY LJ. 849 (1976); Gorby & Jones, West GermanAbortion Decision: A Contrastto Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 551 (1976); Kommers,
Liberty and Community in ConstitutionalLaw: The Abortion Cases in ComparativePerspective,
1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371 [hereinafter Kommers, Liberty and Community]; Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Germany, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L 255 (1977) [hereinafter Kommers, Abortion and Constitution]. For a recent comparison in German, see
Brugger, Abtreibung-ein Grundrecht oder ein Verbrechen?: Ein erglelch der Urtelle des
United States Supreme Court und des BVerfl,

14 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIPT 896

(1986).
4. Liberalism defines the relationship between the individual and state. As the Introduction will discuss, the problem of abortion is a problem of liberal issues, such as the meaning of
individuality, which may or may not encompass the fetus; the nature of the liberal state, which
should be neutral and fair towards all individuals; and the extent of liberal freedom, which
should assure all individuals the right to make decisions without state interference.
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third, the German dissent. These three opinions reflect three traditions

within liberalism. Roe v. Wade reflects the classical liberalism of judicial
review, the German dissent reflects the classical liberalism of parliamen-

tary supremacy, and the German majority reflects a nondemocratic form
of liberalism historically peculiar to Germany, which will be referred to

as German authoritarian liberalism.5
B.

The Reasoning of Each Opinion

Although the three opinions made very different formal legal arguments, one common underlying legal issue can focus attention for comparative purposes: When and under what circumstances is abortion
permissible? All three opinions defined a range of legally permissible
abortions; they differed on the extent of that range and the reasons for it.

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a Texas criminal abortion law, which was typical of abortion laws in most states, violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The Texas law proscribed procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice to
save the mother's life.7 The Supreme Court held that the due process
protection of the right to privacy against state action included a woman's

qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.8 The Supreme Court defined
the possible qualifications of the right in terms of pregnancy's three tri5. To avoid any confusion at the outset, it should be noted that German authoritarian
liberalism is not the same thing as Nazism, although it might have provided the soil in which
Nazism grew. For a discussion of the relationship of the German opinions to Nazism, see
supra text accompanying notes 364-367. To show how the three liberal traditions reflected in
the three opinions approach the tension within liberalism, the comparison must be both specific and abstract. The foundation of the comparison must be specific: it must address legal
arguments of the three opinions. That is, the opinions must be presented on their own terms
because each opinion tied its legal arguments to the formal legal issues it directly addressed,
The very specificity of the formal legal arguments, however, makes their comparison problematical since the Supreme Court and the BVerfG addressed different formal legal issues in reviewing different statutes within different constitutional structure.%In addition to this level of
specificity, the formal legal arguments reflected certain assumptions and attitudes about constitutional decision-making in these three opinions, and these rise to a level of abstraction in
which comparison can take place. The assumptions concern legal reasoning and the attitudes
concern politics. Both can be understood in terms of liberalism. Liberalism provides a framework for understanding the legal assumptions and political attitudes about constitutional decision-making in these three opinions, for both liberalism and constitutionalism straddle the
realms of law and politics. In short, the comparison takes place on a level of abstraction
concerning liberalism, but is based on a level of specificity concerning formal legal arguments
in which the comparison itself does not take place.
6. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). See also id. at 117-18.
7. Id. at 117-18.
8. Id. at 152-54.
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mesters.9 During the first trimester, "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician. '"" After the first trimester, the State may regulate
the abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to promoting the
State's interest in protecting the mother's health."1 After the fetus
reaches viability, which is approximately at the beginning of the third
trimester, the State may regulate abortion, or even proscribe it (unless
necessary to preserve the mother's life or health) in order to promote the
State's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. 2
The law challenged before the BVerfG was the Abortion Reform
Act of 1974,1' which revised section 218 of West Germany's national
Penal Code and was passed by the Bundestag, the lower house of West
Germany's Parliament.1 4 The purpose of the Abortion Reform Act was
not to declare abortion a right, but rather to protect fetal life by deterring
women from abortion. 5 Deterrence was to be achieved through counsel9. Id. at 162-65.
10. Id. at 164.
11. Id. at 163-64.
12. Id. at 163-65. Roe v. Wade stated that it should "be read together with its companion
case," Doe v. Bolton. Id. at 165. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Supreme Court
struck down Georgia's abortion law, which, like abortion laws in approximately one-fourth of
the states, was patterned after the American Law Institutes Model Penal Code. Id. at 182.
The Georgia law proscribed abortion except when necessary, in the judgment of a licensed
Georgia physician, to prevent danger to the pregnant woman's life or health; when the fetus
would be born with a serious defect; or when the pregnancy resulted from rape. Id. at 183.
The Georgia law also required the fulfillment of additional conditions, including, most importantly, that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCA-), that the hospital staff abortion committee approve the
procedure, and that independent examinations of the patient by two other licensed physicians
confirm the performing physician's judgment. Id. at 183-84. The Supreme Court held that
these three conditions violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 201. The hospital requirement was held invalid both because it failed to exclude the first trimester and because the State
failed to show a legitimate relationship to its interest in protecting the pregnant woman's
health. Id. at 193-95. The required intervention of the hospital abortion committee was held
invalid because it unduly restricted the pregnant woman's rights without serving any legitimate purpose of either the hospital or State. Id. at 195-97. The requirement of acquiescence by
two other physicians was held invalid because it "has no rational connection with a patient's
needs and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice." Id. at 199.
13. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ge., 39 BVerfGE 1, 2
(1975). In West Germany the debate about abortion is commonly referred to as the debate
about section 218.
14. See also Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United States: A ComparativeStudy, 58 MicH. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (1960). The Bundesrat, the other house of West
Germany's Parliament, refused its consent to the law. The Bundestag found that the
Bundesrat'sconsent was unnecessary. The BVerfG rejected the claim that the law was invalid
because the Bundesrat refused its consent. 39 BVerfGE at 17-18, 33-35.
15. 39 BVerfGE at 11, 12, 24-25, 27.
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ing rather than penal sanctions.16 Thus, the Abortion Reform Act required a pregnant woman to undergo counseling to discourage her from
procuring an abortion before an abortion could be legally performed. 7
The Abortion Reform Act curtailed penal sanctions based on the reasoning that these sanctions did not effectively deter abortion and might keep
a woman from seeking counseling."' An abortion would not be punishable if performed in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy by a licensed
physician with the consent of the pregnant woman1 9 and thereafter if the
abortion was performed for medical reasons (that is, for preserving the
woman's life or health),20 or for eugenic reasons (that is, for averting the
birth of a seriously deformed child).21
The formal legal issue before the BVerfG in regard to abortion was
fundamentally different from the one before the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade. Roe v. Wade addressed the issue of whether a woman has a constitutionally based right to abortion. 22 The BVerfG did not. Rather, both
the German majority and the German dissent agreed with the premise
underlying the Abortion Reform Act: human life, including fetal life,
requires protection. 23 Having accepted this premise and thereby having
rejected a right to abortion, the German opinions addressed a meansoriented issue: whether the means chosen by the 'legislature to protect
human life were legitimate.24 More particularly, the issue before the
BVerfG was whether the best way to protect human life might be the
Abortion Reform Act's elimination of penal sanctions for abortion in the
first three months of pregnancy while providing for mandatory counseling to discourage abortion.2 5 The majority of the BVerfG concluded
16. Id. at 11, 15-16, 27-28.
17. Id. at 4, 5-6 (citing Abortion Reform Act, 5 Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts
[StrRG] § 218(c), 1974 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 1 1297).
18. Id. at 11, 15-16, 27-28.
19. Id. at 3-4, 5 (citing Abortion Reform Act, 5 StrRG § 218(a), 1974 BGBII 1297).
20. Id. at 4, 5 (citing Abortion Reform Act, 5 StrRG § 218(b)(1), 1974 BGBI.I 1297),
21. Id. (citing Abortion Reform Act, 5 StrRG § 218(b)(2), 1974 BGBLI 1297).
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
23. 39 BVerfGE at 20, 68-69, 85, 86. Both decisions agreed further that human life begins
twelve days after conception upon implantation. Id. at 14.
24. Id. at 3, 51, 68-69.
25. Id. at 3-6, 51. In the language of the German abortion debate, the German majority
and dissent supported an indications solution and a term solution, respectively. An indications
solution allows an abortion for reasons or under conditions defined by law, such as medical
reasons (medical indication); eugenic reasons (eugenic indication); ethical reasons, as in the
case of incest or rape (ethical indication); and social reasons (social indication). A term solution allows an abortion for whatever reason, that is, regardless of an indication, within a given
stage of pregnancy. See Gorby & Jones, supra note 3, at 559 nn.3 & 5; Kommers, Abortion and
Constitution, supra note 2, at 261 n.28.
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that it was not.
The BVerfG declared unconstitutional and invalidated section
218(a), the section of the Abortion Reform Act that permitted abortion
upon the woman's request after counseling during the first twelve weeks
of pregnancy. 26 The BVerfG held that the fetus was entitled to protection under the Basic Law, West Germany's constitution,27 based on article 2, paragraph 2, sentence 1, which states: "Everyone has the right to
life and bodily integrity,"2 and article 1, paragraph 1, sentence 1, which
guarantees the inviolability of human dignity.29 More importantly, the
BVerfG held that the legislature must enact laws that effectively protect
the fetus throughout pregnancy against attacks from the state or
others,30 including the mother.3 1 Consequently, the legislature is dutybound to enact laws that protect fetal life with penal sanctions. 32 In effect, the BVerfG directed the legislature to reestablish abortion as a
crime sanctioned with punishment under the Penal Code. Until the legislature did so, the BVerfG announced that abortion would be permitted
during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy for medical or eugenic reasons, as provided by section 218(b), and for ethical reasons (that is, for
pregnancies caused by rape).33 Furthermore, penal sanctions could be
withheld at the discretion of the court for an abortion performed during
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy for social reasons (that is, for an abortion that was the only remaining measure reasonably expected to relieve
the pregnant woman of a grave hardship).3 4
The German dissent objected to invalidating section 218(a) since, in
its view, the real issue was not whether fetal life should be protected, but
how it could best be protected.3 5 That determination, according to the
dissent, should be made by the legislature, not the BVerfG,3 6 and the
resulting law should be invalidated by the BVerfG only if the law's
method of protection is ineffective beyond a doubt. 37 Yet, the dissent
concluded that it was not beyond a doubt that penal sanctions would
26. Id. at 1.

27. Graham, New FundamentalLaw for the Western German Federal Republic, 43 AM. J.
INT'L L. 494, 496 (1949); Kauper, supra note 14, at 1093.
28. 39 BVerfGE at 2.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.

35. Id. at 68-69.
36. Id. at 69.
37. Id. at 77-78.
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protect fetal life more effectively than the Abortion Reform Act. 8 The
crux of the dissent's argument was that expanding the number of abortions not subject to penal sanctions within a framework of proper social
supports for pregnant women can ultimately reduce the number of actual
abortions.3 9

The central disagreement between the German majority and dissent
relates to how the state should fulfill its duty under the Basic Law to
protect human life in light of the concept in West German constitutionalism of an "objective ordering of values." 4

The objective ordering of val-

ues refers to the norms governing the exercise of state power in
protecting rights and constructing a socially just political order.41 The
dissent found that, since the objective ordering of values requires positive, affirmative state action to construct a socially just political orderaction that properly should be taken by the legislature-42 --the legislature
should carry out the state's duty of protecting life.43 The majority found
that the objective ordering of values, including the duty under the Basic
Law to protect human life, was more readily amenable to the BVerfG's
power ofjudicial review.' In addition, the dissent's highlighting and the
majority's subordinating the importance of the legislature in constructing
a socially just political order illustrates the dissent's placing more importance than the majority on another concept in West German constitutionalism- that of a free social state. This concept, which is not in the
United States Constitution, is that an essential characteristic of freedom
is the obligation of a democratic state to take positive, affirmative steps to
promote social welfare.45 Thus, the majority subordinated the impor38. Id. at 87-89.
39. Id. at 89.
40. Id. at 41, 70-71. See generally Kommers, Abortion and Constitution, supra note 3, at
273 n.66. The expression in German-objektive Wertentscheidungen-also translates as "objective value decisions."
41.

E.-W. B6CKENF6RDE, STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT, FREIHErr: STUDIEN ZUR STAAT-

STHEORIE UND ZUM VERFASSUNGSRECHT 81-84 (1976); Kommers, Abortion and Constitution,
supra note 3, at 273 n.66; B. PIEROTH & B. SCHLINK, GRUNDRECHTE: STAATSRECH II 2729 (1986); G. ROPKE, SCHWANGERSCHAFrSABBRUCH UND GRUNDGESETz 64 (1975).

42. Kommers, Abortion and Constitution,supra note 3, at 273 n.66; G. ROPIE, supra note
41, at 64.

43. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W, Ger., 39 BVerfGE at
71-73, 81, 84-85, 88-89, 95 (1975).
44. See 39 BVerfGE at 51, 65-67.
45. E.-W. BOCKENF6RDE, supra note 41, at 76-81, 244; Hiiberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, 30 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSREC11TLEHRER 43, 56-57, 92-97 (1972); Kauper, supra note 14, at 1094, 1096, 1136; B, PIEROTH &
B. SCHLINK, supra note 41, at 25-26.
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tance of the legislature's passage of laws to promote a free social state to
the BVerfG's protection of human rights through judicial review.

C. The Liberal Dilemma of Constitutional Decision-Making: Power
and Freedom

One of liberalism's most fundamental principles is the rule of lawthe concept that laws should accord equal treatment to all individuals.4"
By putting into issue when in the process of human development an indi-

vidual appears who is guaranteed equal treatment under the rule of
law,47 the problem of abortion opens up a dilemma at the heart of liber-

alism. This dilemma concerns decision-making within a constitutional
democracy, for the problem of abortion raises several questions concerning who should make decisions and how decisions should be made. Who

should make the decision about the appearance of individuality? Does
the decision fall within the woman's realm of freedom or the state's

realm of power? If or to the extent that the decision falls within the
state's realm of power, which state institution should have the authority
to make that decision?"8 This dilemma must be discussed in terms of the
interplay between state and society since the state is the realm of law
(because the state promulgates, administers, and enforces laws),4 9 and
society is the realm of individual activity. 50
This liberal dilemma of constitutional decision-making can be

viewed in terms of either power or freedom. The liberal dilemma of
power is that the state must exercise power to control the ravages of

unrestrained acts of will in society, but the state must also be restrained
in its exercise of power to permit the benefits of acts of will in society. 51
46. See F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 50-51

(1957). See generally R. DAHRENDORF, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY 67-69
(1969); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 422-24 (1967); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIErY 53-54 (1976).
47. Put another way, when in the process of human development should laws accord the
equal treatment guaranteed by the rule of law to all individuals? The problem of abortion is
especially powerful because the issue of the origin of individuality it raises is crucial for the
liberal rule of law as well as religion and biology.
48. The thesis that the abortion issue opens up a dilemma in the heart of liberalism suggests that the issue will take on more political weight in a constitutional democracy than in a
state with another form of government. In a constitutional democracy abortion is likely to
expose tensions in liberal law, while elsewhere it remains essentially a question of policy.
49. F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 26. See generally R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 58-60,
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICs 73, 161 (1975).
50. F. UNGER, supra note 46, at 58-60; RL UNGER, supra note 49, at 73, 161.
51. The liberal dilemma of power has its origins in liberalism's appearance as an ideology
with the rise of the nation-state. Liberalism had to justify both the existence and benefits of
state sovereignty. The existence of state sovereignty depended upon the new nation-state's
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The liberal dilemma of freedom is that the state may not interfere with
the freedom of individuals in society to act at will, but the state must
interfere with such freedom to prevent its infringing upon the freedom of
52
other individuals in society to act at will.
The liberal dilemma of power and freedom is central to each abortion opinion's definition of individuality under the rule of law. In one
way or another, each opinion dealt with the appearance of individuality
in terms of the nature of a woman's act of will in aborting a fetus and the
nature of the state's power in prohibiting abortion in the interest of the
fetus. Thus, each opinion addressed the liberal issue of whether a woman's act of will to abort a fetus infringes upon the self-interest of another individual that the state should protect, and whether the state's
exercise of power to prevent abortions 3infringes upon a woman's freedom
5
to act at will without state coercion.
D.

The State's Separation from Society
The liberal dilemma of power and freedom is also important for un-

acquiring and using enough coercive force to unify a large territory into a single political
entity. By establishing political unity, the state established law and order, which are preconditions to individual rights and new forms of social and economic activities. These individual
rights and new forms of activities, however, could flourish only if not interfered with by the
state's exercise of coercive force. Thus, the liberal dilemma of power exists in the state's simultaneously acquiring and being able to use force to assure its existence, and being restrained in
the use of force to allow individuals and society to reap the benefits of the state's existence. See
generally Neumann, The Concept of PoliticalFreedom, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 919, 923-24
(1953); R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 84, 88. See also E.-W. B6CKI!.NF RDE, supra note 41, at
186-87.
52. The liberal dilemma of freedom, in focusing upon the power of the individual in society to act at will, has two interrelated dimensions-one positive, the other negative. Positive
freedom is self-determination-the individual's power to pursue his or her own self-interest
and thus also unfold his or her potential in society without being subject to another's selfinterest. It is exemplified by the new forms of social and economic activities made possible by
the emerging nation-state. Since positive freedom must be protected against state interference
to flourish, negative freedom must also exist, Le., the individual's power to act at will without
coercion from the state. Negative rights are typically defined in the context of criminal law,
for the danger of the state's improperly infringing upon individual liberty is greatest when the
state imposes penal sanctions. Since in society there is a perpetual struggle among individuals
pursuing their own self-interests, the state must intervene to protect against some individuals
overstepping the bounds of self-interest and clashing with the self-interests of others. Thus, the
liberal dilemma of freedom exists in positive freedom's both needing protection against coercion from the state, Le., negative freedom, and needing intervention by the state to assure that
the excessive self-interest of one does not undermine the self-intercst of others. See generally
Neumann, supra note 51, at 903-04, 914-15, 918-19; F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 201-02;
R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 64-67, 75, 84.
53. In the public abortion debate in the U.S., these two questions have been expressed in
the popular slogans "the right to life" and "the right to choose."
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derstanding the three abortion opinions because it leads to the issue of
the state's separation from society. The state unifies a new political entity over and despite the diversities in society. The state also maintains
order over those diversities in society, restraining antagonism and protecting against the excesses of self-interest.5 4 It accomplishes these tasks
through the rule of law. 5 To accord equal treatment to all individuals,
laws must be written in general and neutral terms and must be applied
uniformly.5 6 In both viewing and treating citizens as fundamentally
equal under the law, the rule of law sets forth a political ideal of formal
equality.17 In contrast to the state-with its political ideal of formal
equality embodied in the rule of law-society is the domain of conflict
among individuals pursuing their self-interest in circumstances of actual
social and economic inequality."
The separation between state and society is inherently unstable, for
the state, like individuals in society, acquires its own self-interest. The
state must acquire its own coercive force, first to unirfy the political
realm,5 9 and then to enforce laws coercively against individuals whose
self-interests exceed their allegiance to the common end of neutral state
law.' Because of this concentration of power surpassing any in society
itself, the state's self-interest naturally threatens individual self-interest
and freedom. 6 '
The state acquires a further self-interest characteristic of society because its structures of authority emerge from society.62 Thus the state
can preserve the neutrality and uniform application of laws only through
the exercise of political power by participants from society. 63-- The exercise of that political power tends to skew the formation and application
of laws towards the self-interest of those in power. 6 The more that political power is exercised in the self-interest of those in power, the more the
state resembles just another self-interested entity in society.
54. R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 59; R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 73-75, 84.
55. P. UNGER, supra note 49, at 73-75, 84.
56. F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 28, 50-51; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 52-54; R.
UNGER, supra note 49, at 73.

57. Neumann, supra note 51, at 908; 1. UNGER, supra note 46, at 54; R. UNGER, supra
note 49, at 74, 151.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 74-75, 151, 160-62.
Neumann, supra note 51, at 923-24.
R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 73, 75.
Neumann, supra note 51, at 914-15, 917.
K UNGER, supra note 46, at 61; 1. UNGER, supra note 49, at 73.
R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 61, 178-81.
Id. at 68-69, 221-22; R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 73.
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E. Three Liberal Traditions: Parliamentary Supremacy, Judicial
Review, and German Authoritarian Liberalism
The three abortion opinions had different approaches to defining individuality under the rule of law and to determining who or which institution should make decisions concerning abortion. These approaches
reflect different liberal traditions-traditions that make different evaluations of power and freedom and of the state and society.
In its argument for upholding an abortion law passed by the legislature, the German dissent illustrates the tradition of parliamentary
supremacy. This tradition focuses on the state as the framework within
which antagonistic interests are represented and reconciled.6 5 Under
parliamentary supremacy, the state's sovereignty resides in the legislature-the institution of government representing the people." Rights
are secured and protected by the legislature, 67 and these rights are positive in that they are an aspect of self-determination.68
Roe v. Wade, in finding a right to privacy that included a right to
abortion free from state encroachment, 69 worked within the liberal tradition of judicial review. This tradition highlights the role of the judiciary
in protecting the negative-or "juristic"-freedom of individuals against
the state.70 Compared with parliamentary supremacy, judicial review
pays more attention to constitutionalism, under which a system of norms
enforced by the courts limits the power of the state and takes precedence
over the positive laws passed by the legislature. 7I Rights secured and protected by the courts are negative, or juristic, because they protect a range
65. See R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 73.
66. F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 89.
67. Neumann, supra note 51, at 927; Rommen, NaturalLaw in Decisions of the Federal
Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalCourts in Germany, 4 NAT. L. F. 1, 2 (1959); F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 44, 89. See also Dietze, NaturalLaw in Modern European Constitutions, 1 NAT. L. F. 73, 77-78 (1956).
68. Neumann, supra note 51, at 915. See also F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 202; R,
UNGER, supra note 49, at 64, 66, 84.
69.

Cf R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY

AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (1984) ("Privacy ...

is a historical product; it emerges only

when there is a public domain, that is, in relation to the state.").
70. F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 89. See also Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 781 n.11 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The

character of the Court's language in these cases brings to mind the origins of the American
heritage of freedom-the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain intrusions on
the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable.").
71. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 25, 142-43 (1969); Neumann, supra note

51, at 904; F.

NEUMANN,

supra note 46, at 89.
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of activities by individuals against state intrusion. 2
While parliamentary supremacy stresses rights protected by the legislature and judicial review stresses rights protected by the courts, both
traditions are forms of classical liberalism in that they were conceived
within a democratic framework.'
In striking down an abortion law
passed by the legislature because that law did not uphold the moral values of the state, the German majority carried forward a tradition of
nondemocratic authoritarian liberalism, 4 which focuses on the state as
5
the ideal realm of law above the antagonism of competing self-interest.7
In this uniquely German form of liberalism, the state realizes freedom
and is the agent of freedom. Consequently, freedom is not focused
against the state.7 6 German authoritarian liberalism focuses on the preliminary liberal notion that the state is a prerequisite for freedom rather
than the later liberal notion that the state threatens freedom.7
F. Liberalism and the Problem of Abortion in the Three Opinions
In defining the range of permissible abortions, each opinion allotted
decision-making differently. The German majority gave special attention
to the decision of a high court, the German dissent to the decision of a
legislature, and Roe v. Wade to the decision of a pregnant woman. The
German majority thought in terms of an obedient individual enlightened
by an ideal state. The German dissent thought in terms of an active individual participating in a social democratic state. Roe v. Wade thought in
terms of an isolated individual up against a limited state. In contrast to
72. Neumann, supra note 51, at 903-04, 915; F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 201. See
also R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 84.
73. See R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 88-90. See also Neumann, supra note 51, at 901, 910.
While Roe v. Wade highlighted judicial review for resolving the abortion issue presented to the
Supreme Court, there can be little doubt that it also recognized the legitimacy of the coexistent
tradition of parliamentary supremacy in general. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153-54, 155, 163-64. Cf id. at 173-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, although the German dissent highlighted parliamentary supremacy for resolving the abortion issue presented to the BVerfG, it also recognized the legitimacy of the
coexistent tradition of judicial review in general. See 39 BVerfGE 69-73 (1975). See also
Krieger, Europaeischerund amerikanischerLiberalismus, in LIBERALISMUS 158-59, 160 (L
Gall ed. 1985).
74. R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 165, 178, 186, 191.
75. See F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 89; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 187-88, 191; R.
UNGER, supra note 49, at 73.
76. L. KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM 80 (1957).
77. If it is true, as Petchesky writes, that the formation of the state "has invariably
brought drastic changes in the position of women" and the attempt "to reduce women to their
procreative capacities," R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 68, then it might not be surprising
that the abortion opinion following the liberal tradition most heavily influenced by the needs of
state formation was also the opinion most restrictive of abortion.
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Roe v. Wade, both German opinions gave a more prominent role to the
state, although the German majority defined it as above society while the
German dissent defined it as an organ of society. In contrast to the German dissent, the German majority and Roe v. Wade separated the state
from society, although the German majority was suspicious of society,
while Roe v. Wade was suspicious of the state. In contrast to the German
majority, the German dissent and Roe v. Wade had confidence in the
individual, although the German dissent linked individuals to a larger
social democracy, while Roe v. Wade separated individuals into self-contained autonomous entities.
In addressing the issues posed by the problem. of abortion (that is,
the meaning of individuality under the rule of law) in terms of the views
of three liberal traditions toward power and freedom and the state and
society, the three opinions illustrate that the classical liberalism of either
parliamentary supremacy or judicial review is amenable to a wider range
of legally permissible abortions than German authoritarian liberalism.
Sections II and III discuss how the German majority reasoned by synthesis, as is typical of German authoritarian liberalism, while Roe v. Wade
and the German dissent reasoned by analysis, as is typical of classical
liberalism. In reasoning by synthesis, the German majority formulated
issues in terms of abstractions and absolutes, which were inhospitable to
justifications for abortion. Both Roe v. Wade and the German dissent
were sympathetic to larger ranges of legally permissible abortions because their reasoning by analysis was characterized by a democratic respect for moral uncertainty and a diversity of viewpoints and a concern
for social realities.
Sections IV and V discuss the fear reflected in all three opinions that
arbitrariness in the respective abortion laws threatened the equality necessary for the rule of law. The opinions defined different ranges of legally
permissible abortions partly because they feared different types of arbitrariness. The German majority defines the narrowest range partly because German authoritarian liberalism fears the arbitrariness of human
decision-making, whether by democratic majorities or individual women.
Roe v. Wade and the German dissent accepted a wider range of legally
permissible abortions because they feared the arbitrariness of coercive
state laws rather than human decision-making.
Section VI examines how the range of legally permissible abortions
defined by each opinion reflected notions of equality. These notions expose the limits of liberalism in each opinion - perhaps because each
opinion reflected the interests of different social classes. The German
majority reflected the traditions of a bureaucratic civil service and the
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academic elite, Roe v. Wade reflected the traditions of bourgeois professionalism, in particular of doctors, and the German dissent reflected the
traditions of a variety of classes, including the lower classes and their
adherence to social democracy.
II.

LEGAL REASONING BY SYNTHESIS OR ANALYSIS:
THE GERMAN MAJORITY AND DISSENT

A. Reasoning by Synthesis or Analysis
The abortion opinions expressed three liberal traditions through two
different styles of legal reasoning. In other words, the opinions reflected
different assumptions, which were characteristic of different liberal traditions, regarding the proper way to resolve legal issues. Those different
styles, or assumptions, led to different evaluations of arguments regarding the permissibility of abortion and to different conclusions about the
range of permissible abortions. In particular, the German majority expressed German authoritarian liberalism through reasoning by synthesis,
and the German dissent and Roe v. Wade expressed classical liberalism
through reasoning by analysis. Whereas reasoning by synthesis tended to
accommodate arguments for restricting the range of permissible abortions, reasoning by analysis accommodated and even generated reasons
for permitting abortions.
Analysis is the process of breaking down complex ideas into their
building blocks and recombining those and other ideas into more complex and general ideas.7" The process of breaking down and recombining
ideas involves particular elements that are independent and distinct from
each other, even when combined into wholes.7 9 Thus, the whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts." Synthesis, on the other hand, conceives of wholes as gaining something genuinely new beyond the sum of
their parts.8 " Thus, the whole is treated as an indivisible unit.12 While
reasoning by analysis tends towards the investigation of particulars, 3
reasoning by synthesis tends towards the construction of conceptual systems. 4 Not surprisingly, reasoning by analysis, with its focus on particulars and distinctions, directs attention towards social realities, as in the
German dissent and Roe v. Wade In contrast, reasoning by synthesis,
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

R.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

UNGER, supra note 49, at 46, 121.
at 46, 125.
at 46, 121.
at 47, 121, 123, 125.
at 125-26.
at 48.
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with its focus on ultimate abstract wholes, tends to downplay the significance of social realities in comparison to an ideal state, as in the German

majority.
The contrast between the German majority's reasoning by synthesis
and the German dissent's reasoning by analysis may be understood as the
continuation of a historical dispute between German authoritarian liberalism and democratic liberalism. The history of German authoritarian
liberalism is the history of the idea that morality resides in the state,
which is an ideal and spiritual concept, and not, as democratic liberalism
maintained, in the realms of politics and society. The German majority
and dissent disagreed along those precise lines-the majority finding morality in an ideal spiritual state, the dissent finding it in politics and society. The opinions carried forward the dispute within a new framework:
the proper scope of judicial review. The Basic Law's establishment of a
constitutional court, the BVerfG, and its power to enforce a Bill of
Rights through judicial review of laws was unprecedented in German
legal history." With this relatively short tradition of judicial review, the
majority and dissent conceived of judicial review in terms of German
authoritarian and democratic liberalism, respectively.
B.

Reasoning by Synthesis: The German Majority

As characteristic of reasoning by synthesis, the German majority
resolved issues pertaining to abortion into an ultimate and indivisible
concept: one of the highest values in the legal order, if not the highest
value, is human life, including fetal life. 86 The concept of human life as
one of the highest values in the legal order links the value placed on
human life to the state's responsibilities toward life. 7 Thus, the state has
a moral obligation to protect human life and to do so by punishing those
who take human life.8 8
In reasoning by synthesis, the German majority viewed human
life-one of the legal order's highest values-as indivisible and, therefore,
an ethical absolute that gives meaning to all other issues pertaining to
abortion. The value of human life in the legal order is indivisible and
ethically absolute because it is not subject to doubt or analysis. 89 As an
85. Dietze, supra note 67, at 83-85; von Mehren, Constitutionalismin Germany, 1 AM. J.
(1985).
86. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 36,

COMP. L. 70, 74 (1952); K. SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 2, 8

37, 41-43, 46-48, 50, 59, 67 (1975).

87. Id. at 42, 47-48, 67.
88. Id. at 41, 42, 4748, 67.
89. See id. at 37, 42, 43, 46, 50, 59.
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ethical absolute, the value of human life in the legal order provides the
source and guidelines for abortion law, 9° including the proper use of penal sanctions, 91 the proper relation of law to society, 92 and the proper
role of governmental institutions.9 3 Thus, in dealing with abortion, the
law should use nonpenal measures before penal sanctions, 94 may take
into account social circumstances, 9" and should be devised by the legislature without necessarily being reviewed by the BVerfG.96 In each of
these instances what is ultimately crucial is that the state protects human
life.97 In short, the majority required all legal issues pertaining to abortion to be resolved in a way that reaffirmed the ultimate ethical absolute
that human life, including fetal life, is one of the legal order's highest
values.
As is also characteristic of reasoning by synthesis, the ethical absolute that human life is one of the highest values in the legal order stands
at the top of a hierarchically structured argument. The value of human
life in the legal order, in the German majority's view, is part of the objective ordering of values, 98 which gives order and structure to legal issues,99 and makes clear that some values are dominant and others
subordinate. Thus, the majority found it obvious that within the legal
order the value of the fetus is quite simply higher than that of a pregnant
woman's right to self-determination." ° Similarly, the majority found it
obvious that the state's obligation to protect human life is more important than the state's pursuit of social goals. 10' The majority's requirement that the legislature impose penal sanctions against abortion as a last
resort" 2 makes clear that the majority deemed penal sanctions to be superior to nonpenal measures, since penal sanctions could be effective
where nonpenal sanctions could not. 103
Beyond giving meaning to all legal issues and imposing a hierarchy
of importance on them, the German majority's view of the value of
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 41-42.
Id. at 44-47, 52-53.
Id. at 36, 59.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 44-46, 52-53.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 44, 46, 51, 65, 67.
Id. at 46-47, 51, 59, 67.
Id. at 36, 41-42.
Id. at 41-42, 47.
Id. at 42-44, 47, 66.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47, 57-58, 65-66.
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human life in the legal order was characteristic of reasoning by synthesis
in that the form of the opinion indicates its drafters' concern with the
aesthetic coherence of the text itself. Because the value of life in the legal
order is indivisible and ethically absolute, the majority placed importance
on reasoning that was internally consistent and complete. Thus, the majority stressed that a "total view" of constitutional norms regarding abortion was necessary' °4 and that the state's protection of human life had to
be "comprehensive." 10 5 The majority held the Abortion Reform Act unconstitutional because its omission of penal sanctions for abortion left a
"gap" in the state's protection of life106 and "a realm devoid of law," 10 7
The state could protect human life only by imposing penal sanctions to
plug the gap. 10 In short, the majority's drafters seem to have thought
that the state's protection of human life must achieve an almost poetic
unity and wholeness.
The German majority's concern with the aesthetic coherence of the
text is confirmed by its almost parochial reliance upon German sources
of law. The majority stressed the importance of Germany's legal tradition. 0 9 It found support for the proposition that the right to life pursuant to article 2, paragraph 2, sentence 1 of the Basic Law includes fetuses
from the history of that article's origins. 1" 0 It found support for the
proposition that abortion is killing in the fact that abortion historically
and consistently has been dealt with in the Criminal Code, currently
under the section "Crimes and Offenses Against Life," and previously
under the heading "Killing the Fetus.""' Finally, the majority insisted
that West Germany had to establish its own response to the abortion
issue because West Germany had to maintain its own legal standards to
repudiate the Nazi past." 2
Complementing concern with the aesthetic coherence of the text, the
majority downplayed considerations from outside the text. Thus, the
majority subordinated the importance of the personal and social
problems faced by pregnant women. 1 3 The majority ignored empirical
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 36. See also id. at 45, 46.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 55. See also id. at 37, 47.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 47. See also id. at 37.
Id. at 45, 46, 57.
Id. at 38-40.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 66-67.
See id. at 43, 56.
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data unless the data refuted arguments for abortion reform. 1 4 In insisting that West Germany had to maintain its own legal standards, the majority deemed the recent liberalization of abortion laws in other Western
democracies irrelevant to West Germany' 15 and referred to foreign abortion laws only to show how they did not meet West Germany's
116
standards.
The majority's commitment to the indivisible concept and ethical
absolute that human life is one of the legal order's highest values and to
the aesthetic coherence of the text is also reflected in the majority's view
on the state's public stance toward abortion. The majority insisted that
the legal order must unequivocally disapprove of abortion, 1 7 thus making clear to the populace the difference between right and wrong."" 8
Consequently, the state must punish abortion as a declaration that the
state will uphold human life as the legal order's highest value.'1 9 Moral
standards-as set by the state and understood by the populace--can be
indivisible and ethically absolute because ideas (such as the moral standards) and consciousness (such as the ideas' being understood) can be
unambiguous and complete. 2
The German majority's reasoning by synthesis is characteristic of
German authoritarian liberalism. The concept that human life is one of
the legal order's highest values is an absolute that is central to the legal
order and an ideal that must characterize the state. As an absolute, the
concept is universal, timeless, and not open to question or contradiction,
even from a legislature. As an ideal, the concept is an abstraction that
need not bow to social reality. As an absolute and ideal, this concept
imposes a hierarchy and form on legal thinking that provides answers to
the abortion issue with certainty and finality.
But, the synthesis attained by the majority is more aesthetically
pleasing than persuasive. The concept that human life is one of the legal
order's highest values holds together the majority's arguments only because the majority read the concept into its hierarchically structured and
aesthetically coherent argument and insisted that the concept was indivisible. However, if the concept is not treated as indivisible but is subjected to analysis, then the majority's absolutes might be questioned, its
114. Id. at 53, 60.
115. Id. at 66.
116. Id. at 60, 64, 66.
117. Id. at 44, 53.
118. Id. at 57-59, 65-66. See also id. at 53.
119. See id. at 57-59, 65-66.
120. In contrast, social reality, which cannot have the purity of ideas or consciousness,
tends to be relative and ambiguous.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

(Vol. I1I

hierarchy might collapse, and its aesthetic coherence might be deemed
irrelevant. This was the challenge posed by the German dissent and, in a
comparative perspective, by Roe v. Wade.
C.

Reasoning by Analysis: The German Dissent

If the German majority recognized a relatively narrow range of permissible abortions because of its belief in an ethical absolute in the legal
order, the German dissent and Roe v. Wade recognized wider ranges of
permissible abortions because of their commitments to two values of
classical liberalism: political diversity and moral uncertainty. 12 1 These
two values manifest reasoning by analysis in the political realm. In reasoning by analysis, different individuals can arrange ideas in a variety of
ways to build a variety of separate and independent arguments. 122 In
political terms, such analysis results in political diversity since the possibility of arranging ideas differently leads to a diversity of legitimate viewpoints, and results in moral uncertainty since the variety of arguments
leaves uncertain which viewpoint is right. By reasoning by analysis and
thus recognizing both political diversity and moral uncertainty, the German dissent and Roe v. Wade were both able to accept the legitimacy of
reasons for permitting abortions, which the German majority could not.
Whereas the German majority viewed the abortion issue as governed by an indivisible ethical absolute' 2 3-that the state must protect
fetal life like all other human life-the German dissent viewed the issue
as unique.1 24 The dissent was able to draw out the uniqueness of the
abortion issue by breaking down the issue's characteristics and comparable issues into component parts, that is, by drawing distinctions. The
dissent distinguished among the following: various types of killings, such
as homicide, 'euthanasia, and abortion; 2 5 stages in the course of pregnancy;' 2 6 reasons for abortion; 2 7 and methods of protecting fetal life.'2 8
These analytical distinctions made clear to the dissent that abortion was
unique, for it was different in its essence from all other circumstances in
121. See R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 11-13, 140-41; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at
69, 84, 167-70.
122. See generally R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 48, 121-23.
123. See text accompanying notes 86-97.
124. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Vt. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 55,
78, 79 (1975).
125. Id. at 55, 78-80.
126. Id. at 80-81.
127. Id. at 83-84.
128. Id. at 78-80.
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which the state must protect life.129
The analytical distinctions also made clear to the German dissent
that the abortion issue was complex130 and, therefore, characterized
by moral uncertainty. According to the dissent, the majority essentially
32
ignored the uniqueness 131 and the complexity of the abortion issue,1
13 3
13 4
taking a dogmatic and rigoristic approach.
In contrast to the majority's belief that answers flowed inevitably from an indivisible premise,
the dissent found that a range of factors had to be considered. In further
contrast to the majority, which defined the abortion issue from the perspective of an ideal state and aesthetically coherent text, the dissent defined the issue in terms of complex social problems. 3 5 In light of these
36
problems, the dissent indicated that finding a solution was difficult;1
that no solution could have sure results, 3 7 or be gapless, as the majority
seemed to think;' 38 that any solution was at best piecework;' 3 9 and that,
thus, a variety of solutions could be legitimate."4 Even penal law, according to the dissent, does not represent absolute standards. Rather, it
is subject to change. For example, the dissent pointed out that the draft
law prohibiting abortion recommended by the federal government in the
early 1960s rejected certain exceptions, such as the ethical, eugenic, and
4
social exceptions. Now even the majority accepted these exceptions.' '
In short, the dissent subjected the majority's premise to analysis, uncovering complexity instead of indivisibility, and uncertainty instead of a
moral absolute.
The German dissent's acceptance of uncertainty was integrally related to its commitment to political diversity and, more particularly, to
democracy. In the tradition of democratic liberalism, political diversity
within the state implied a range of legitimate moral viewpoints, and that
range implied that no particular viewpoint could be deemed conclusively
129. Id.

130. Id. at 81, 91. See also id. at 71-72.
131. Id. at'69, 78.
132. Id. at 81-82.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 90. See also id. at 88.
135. Id. at 69, 81. See also id. at 83-85, 87.
136. Id. at 82, 84-85, 91.
137. Id. at 91. See also id. at 73, 78.
138. Id. at 87-88.
139. Id. at 69, 90.
140. Id. at 71-72, 80, 82, 85, 88, 90-91.
141. Id. at 74-75. Thus, unlike the majority, the dissent did not contend that punishment is
the state's requisite declaration of its commitment to an ethical absolute by disapproving abortion. See id. at 92, 93-94.
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correct at the expense of the others.142 However, because issues surrounded by moral disagreement and uncertainty must be resolved, they
should be resolved by democratic procedures and institutions, which can
take into account a range of viewpoints. 143 In keeping with this tradition, the dissent found that the legislature is best suited to evaluate the
complexities of the abortion issue, 144 and is entitled to devise and choose
among a variety of solutions. 145 In passing the Abortion Reform Act, in
the dissent's view, the legislature examined the essential points of view
exhaustively, seriously, and in depth, in a way that surely met the stan1 46
dards of a free democratic state.
Thus, while the German majority believed that authority could be
centralized in an abstract idea- 4 7 -the ethical absolute that one of the
legal order's highest values is human life-the German dissent believed
that authority must be dispersed through democratic procedures and institutions in order to accommodate political diversity and meet moral
uncertainty. The democratic dispersion of authority meant not only legislative representation, but more broadly, a separation of powers. The
concept of a separation of powers complemented the concepts of moral
uncertainty and political diversity by shifting focus from substance to
procedure. 14 8 Thus, the dissent stressed the lines along which powers of
particular governmental institutions should be separated. 149 The BVerfG
and the legislature each have a specialized competence, with the BVerfG
having the authority to decide defensive rights 50 and the legislature the
authority to decide issues of the objective ordering of values.'
The dissent warned of the danger of shifting competence from the legislature to
142. See R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 11-12.
143. See id. at 11-13.
144. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 82,
85, 90-91 (1975). See id. at 71-72.
145. Id. at 72-73, 80, 85, 90-91.
146. Id. at 85. See also id. at 88.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 86-103.
148. The dissent's shift in focus from substance to procedure i5 also clear in its emphasis
that the issue is not whether human life should be protected, but how. See 39 BVerfGE at 6970.
149. Id. at 69-72.
150. Id. at 70-71. "Defensive rights" and "subjective rights" are the terms used in the
German opinions for negative rights. Id. at 41, 70-71. As in the U.S. tradition of judicial
review, these rights are subjective insofar as they belong to the individual, and defensive insofar as they protect individual liberty against intrusive actions by the state. See E.-W. BOCKENFORDE, supra note 41, at 224-28; F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 23; B. PIEROTii & B.
SCHLINK, supra note 41, at 21.
151. 3 BVerfGE at 71-72.
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the BVerfG, 15 2 in particular with regard to the objective ordering of val153
ues, which requires active social measures.
The implication of the German dissent's belief in dispersing authority is that the liberal state's moral concern should not be, as the majority
seemed to think, with stating correct moral conclusions, but rather with
providing appropriate procedures and institutions for devising practical
political solutions to moral issues. Taken together, democratic procedures and institutions and a separation of powers perform three complementary functions in dispersing authority: they give expression to
political diversity, provide the political mechanism for resolving issues
surrounded by moral disagreement, and weaken any sense that moral
certainty could underlie the political order.
While the German dissent linked moral uncertainty and political diversity to democracy and a separation of powers, the dissent also linked
them to legal diversity. The dissent distinguished among types of lawincluding constitutional law, legislation, church law, and foreign law.' 54
Having made these distinctions, the dissent drew upon a variety of
sources of law. It bolstered its arguments with references to historical
sources of abortion law, 15 1 foreign judicial decisions on abortion, and
abortion law reform in several foreign states.' 5 6 The foreign states that
had passed liberalized abortion laws had constitutional provisions, legal
traditions, and social problems similar to West Germany's, and those
states were no less respectful of human life than West Germany.' 5 7 Juxtaposed to these foreign laws, the Abortion Reform Act, the dissent concluded, could not be deemed wrong in either a legal or moral sense.' 58
Thus, in contrast to the German majority, which asserted an absolute
moral stance and relied upon no foreign law, the dissent's drawing upon
diverse legal sources eroded any moral certainty about conclusions
drawn from any purported ethical absolute.
The German dissent's reasoning by analysis gave the opinion an almost centripetal force,' 5 9 for the dissent pursued arguments that suggested conclusions out of harmony with its explicit premises. The dissent
152. Id. at 69-73.
153. Id. at 70-72, 78-79, 85.

154. Id. at 75-77, 78, 90-91, 94-95.
155. Id. at 75-77, 81.
156. Id. at 71, 73-74, 81, 93, 94-95.
157. Id. at 94.
158. Id.
159. Reasoning by analysis can have this centripetal effect since it allows the same evidence
to be used in a variety of ways and thus possibly to support contrary conclusions. See generally R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 48, 121-23.
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shifted focus from protecting fetal life to permitting abortion. 160 Thus,
one dissenter, Judge Rupp v.-Briinneck, cast doubt on the assumption
that human life begins upon implantation 16 1 (which was implicit in the
legal posture by which the abortion issue reached the BVerfG 162) and
considered it legitimate to evaliate abortion differently according to the
stages of pregnancy. 163 More importantly, in addressing the complexity
of the abortion problem and the range of solutions, the dissent took into
account factors that can be read as arguments for permitting abortion,
such as the dangers of illegal abortions,"r and the variety of social and
individual pressures faced by pregnant women. 165 In fact, since any protection of fetal life is at best patchwork, the dissent found that the legislature may take into account factors66other than protecting life, such as
promoting the interests of women.'
Indeed, the German dissent paid much more attention than the German majority to the interests, needs, and rights of women.' 6 The dissent's attention to women's interests reflected its belief in democracy as a
way of resolving moral issues, in contrast to the majority's belief in punishment as a way of enforcing a purported ethical absolute. The dissent
essentially argued that the best way to protect fetal life is not to impose
penal sanctions after an abortion has taken place but: rather to encourage
a pregnant woman to continue her pregnancy.' 68 The dissent stressed
the importance of counseling.' 69 Such counseling includes a large element of persuasion, which, not coincidentally, is the form of presenting
arguments in a democracy.
In preferring persuasion to punishment,17 0 the German dissent
abandoned the conceptual simplicity of the German majority's argument,
in which the wrongful act of abortion induces the state primarily to punish.' 7 ' Rather, the state is put to the burden of anticipating the possibility of the wrongful act and providing the potential perpetrator with
160. See 39 BVerfGE at 80-84, 88-89, 90-91, 94.
161. Id. at 80.
162. See id. at 14.
163. Id. at 80-81.
164. Id. at 82-83, 90.
165. Id. at 83-84.
166. Id. at 90-91, 94.
167. See id. at 79-80, 83-86, 88-91, 94.
168. See id. at 85-89, 95.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. The majority also considered possible excuses or mitigation, but that consideration
was secondary to punishment. See id.
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reasons and ways not to commit the act."7 2 Providing women with reasons and ways not to have abortions required an understanding of the
pressures that might prompt women to seek abortions.'7 By considering
these pressures, the dissent necessarily exposed reasons for permitting
abortions.

74

In suggesting conclusions out of harmony with its premises, the
German dissent put itself at a tactical disadvantage vis-A-vis the German
majority. In analyzing the concept that the state has an obligation to
protect life, the dissent raised enough issues about the means to reach the
end of protecting life that it cast doubt upon the end itself,' 75 but in
general could not question that end explicitly. Thus, the dissent could
not elaborate upon certain implications of its own arguments for widening the range of permissible abortions whenever doing so might 7be
at
6
odds with its explicit premise about the need to protect fetal life.1
D.

German Authoritarian Liberalism and the German Majority

In reasoning by synthesis, the German majority took an approach
that was authoritarian, hierarchical, antidemocratic, and idealistic, as
characteristic of German authoritarian liberalism.
A key concept in German authoritarian liberalism adopted by the
German majority is that the state is not the enemy of freedom, but rather
the agent of both order and freedom. 77 This concept was a product of
the relatively late but rapid development of the German nation-state.17
After the French Revolution, the political issue commanding attention in
central Europe was state building. Political entities sought to accumulate
power and unify authority in order to sustain a viable nation-state against
172. See id. at 83-84, 86-87.
173. Id. at 83-84.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 160-166. The tension in the German dissent between protecting the fetus and permitting abortion, see supra text accompanying notes 167173, seems to reflect the tension in the parliamentary debates on the Abortion Reform Act
between protecting the fetus and securing a woman's right to self-determination. See G.
KRAIKER, § 218: ZWEI SCHRITrE VORWXRTS, EINEN SCHRrrT ZUROcK 43-49 (1983); M.
KRIELE, LEGITIMITTsPROBLEME DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 174-76 (1977). One might say that
in the dissent the contradiction inherent in parliamentary compromises was simply transformed into a judicial form.
175. Cf. 39 BVerfGE at 59.
176. Cf. G. KRAiKER, supra note 174, at 9 (parliamentary proponents of abortion reform
in the early 1970s narrowed their own maneuvering room by supporting problematic principles
such as the equality or even priority of a basic right of unborn life to a woman's right to selfdetermination).
177. L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 80. See also id. at 5, 44-45, 65, 138, 367.
178. See Krieger, supra note 73, at 154-55.
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French rule.17 9 Under the circumstances, freedom more clearly benefitted than suffered from an increase in state power.'1 0 Preoccupation with
the creation of a viable nation-state did not promote an environment conducive to exploring the menace that state power posed to individual
freedom. 181
German authoritarian liberalism's image of the state as a moral
ideal rather than a pragmatic reality-an image adopted by the German
majority-was a product of the failure of a German nation-state to
emerge immediately after the French Revolution. 18 2 In the first half of
the nineteenth century no political entity was powerful enough to unify
the various German ministates into one territorial state. Thus, German
Idealism, the intellectual movement between 1770 and 1840 that promoted the concepts of German authoritarian liberalism, 1 3 conceived of
the nation-state as an ideal. The ideal was of a German cultural nationa state based upon culture and law."8 4 This ideal replaced power, which
was lacking, with spirit.' 85
In promoting the realm of spirit, German authoritarian liberalism
translated the distinction between spirit and power into the distinction
found in the German majority between state and society.', 6 Turning necessity into a virtue, the German Idealists scorned power, conceiving of
society as the collection of conflicting individual wills and passions, and
adulated spirit, conceiving of the state as embodying the virtues of the
spiritual, cultivated, ideal type of individual and thereby exerting a positive influence upon society. 18 7 To the extent that the German Idealists
179. J. SHEEHAN, GERMAN LIBERALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 8-9, 36 (1978).
180. See also L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 39, 69, 152, 207; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at
186.
181. See L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 80; J. SHEEHAN, supt, note 179, at 39-43.
182. See generally L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 297; F. STERN, THE FAILURE OF ILLIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF MODERN GERMANY 6 (1971).
183. H. HOLBORN, German Idealism in the Light of Social Htistory, in GERMANY AND
EUROPE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 1, 2 (1970); F. STERN, supra note 182, at 6.
184. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 10-11. L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 64-65, F.
STERN, supra note 182, at 12.
185. F. STERN, supra note 182, at 6-7. One dimension of this ideal of a moral, spiritual
state was that freedom meant the internal coherence of the German cultural nation against
foreign oppression. See L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 207. This dimension finds an echo in
the majority's insistence upon applying Germany's own legal standards to the abortion problem without regard to those of other nations. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 66-67 (1975).
186. See generally R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 39, 192; F. STERN, supra note 182,
at 21-22.

187. See H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 25; L. KRIEOER, supra note 76, at 39, 44-45, 5556, 59-61, 64-65, 69-70, 98, 117, 124, 128-29, 132-33, 138, 177, 297, 482-83; F. STERN, supra
note 182, at 9, 11.

1988]

Abortion and Liberalism

recognized that the state's actual power might pose a threat to freedom,
they conceived of the state as subject to internal moral checks, not those
of political institutions.' 8 8 The German Idealists recognized that politics
existed, but they thought that politics, like society, should be modeled
after the state - the embodiment of culture, law, justice, and morality.189 The moral teacher of freedom was the state, not society.' 9°
In reflecting the influence of German authoritarian liberalism, the
majority articulated the world view of a bureaucratic and academic civil
servant class, which historically gave rise to this type of thinking. 9 1 The
peculiar class characteristics of German authoritarian liberalism
originated in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Prussia,
as the first seed of the later German nation-state, in contest with the
judicial authority of princely estates, centralized administrative and legislative power under the monarch.1 92 The economically weak German
middle class understood the benefits of centralization and allied itself
with the Prussian monarch against the princely estates.1 93 As a significant consequence, the middle class exercised the influence it had through
the bureaucracy and universities, not democratic political institutions.'19
That is, the middle class secured the rule of law within the framework of
188. L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 70. See generally id. at 53-58.
189. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 10-11, 15-16; L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 70, 1.
SHEEHAN, supra note 179, at 14, 16-18.
190. L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 64-65, 69, 117, 122-34, 151-52. See also H. HouBoRN,
supra note 183, at 1, 25-26. In an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel in 1975
soon after the decision, Judge Ernst Benda, the president of the BVerfG, reflected the tradition
described in this paragraph by contrasting the inner-oriented contemplative judge--who presumably thereby has better access to the truth-to the legislator
[How do we [judges] differ from politicians? I believe in two essential ways: We
have more time and quiet, more outer and inner distance to evaluate the at times very
complex problems concerning the constitutional aspects of a law... Second, the

constitutional judge does not belong to a faction requiring loyalty or solidarity like a
legislator, but rather can and must decide for himself personally.
Judge Benda's reflections continued:
[T]he process of forming an opinion differs significantly from that in Bonn. I can
form my opinion in no other way than working silently by myself in studying the
record. And then I go with my opinion into the senate. Here I cannot replace a
precise judicial argument, which is expected from each of us, with some sort of profession of loyalty or solidarity to some sort of political group outside.
Spiegel-Gesprdch: Karlsruhe-einverkappter Gesetzgeber?, DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 3, 1975, 68, 74
(author's trans.).
191. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 3-4, 8-9.
192. R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 183-84; E.-W. BOCKENF6RDE, supra note 41, at 102-03.
193. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 10; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 186. See also R.
DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 49-50, 91-92.
194. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 9, 11 (1970); R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 186.
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absolutism rather than parliamentary government. 19' Unlike England's
middle class, which gained power in opposition to the monarchy by entering and reshaping the aristocracy's parliament, 96 the German middle
class did not make political demands, seek political rights, or develop a
strong political opposition.97 Failing to develop a tradition of political
independence, the German middle class gained strength through the civil
service, which was located in the government bureaucracy and universities.98 Thus, German authoritarian liberalism was an attempt to render
the freedom of the economically weak German middle class compatible99
with the institutional structure of the authoritarian monarchical state. 1
In reflecting German authoritarian liberalism, the German majority
drew upon a tradition which extended beyond the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. As Germany underwent massive, rapid industrialization during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
German authoritarian liberalism maintained vitality with its moral objections to the nature of the new industrialized society."° In the tradition
of German Idealism's reaction against the French Revolution, 2° ' conservative German intellectuals rejected Western ideas of parliamentary
government, which they thought was characterized by political tactics,
compromises, and hypocrisy; 20 2 scorned mass society, which they
deemed artificial, atomizing, and destructive;20 3 and idealized the state,
which they viewed as able to meet conflict with ultimate solutions from
objective authority. 2" German authoritarian liberalism looked to state
authority above parties
for a synthesis abolishing the conflicts of political
205
and social reality.
195. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 10-11. See also L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 4445; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 181-86.
196. R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 178, 190.
197. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 8-9, 11; L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 20.
198. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 1, 8-9, 11. See also L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at
19-20; U. WESEL, AUFKL.XRUNGEN OBER RECHT 19 (1981).
199. See H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 10; F. STERN, supra note 182, at 11-12,
200. G. MOSSE, GERMANS AND JEWS: THE RIGHT, THE LEFT AND THE SEARCH FOR A
"THIRD FORCE" IN PRE-NAZi GERMANY 10 (1970). See F. STERN, supra note 182, at xvil-

xviii. See also L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 458.
201. L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 177; F. STERN, supra note 182, at 6.
202. L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 459-60; G. MossE, supra note 200, at 7; F. STERN,
supra note 182, at 18-21, 198-99.
203. See G. MOSSE, supra note 200, at 36; F. STERN, supra note 182, at 21-22. See also L.
KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 187-88.

204. R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 130-3 1; L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 459-60; F.
supra note 182, at 21.
205. See R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 193-94. See also L. KRIEGER, supra note 76,
at 254.
STERN,
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In reasoning by synthesis, the German majority's hierarchically
structured argument and concern with the aesthetic coherence of the text
also reflected the scholarly tradition of German legal science, which complemented and reinforced German authoritarian liberalism within the
legal profession.2 "6 German legal science arose in the mid-nineteenth
century and led to the development of the influential German Civil Code,
which took effect in 1900.207 Its goal was to develop a legal code that
would be complete, coherent, and clear. 08 To derive general principles
from specific legal data, the German Civil Code arranged law from the
specific to the general, in progressively increasing levels of abstraction. °9
German legal scholars were convinced that this arrangement would yield
the highest levels of insight possible and the right answers to new
problems.2" ' Thus, this method was supposed to achieve authoritative
scientific truth.21 1
The German majority's concern with the aesthetic coherence of the
text also reflected another characteristic of German legal science, namely
the method of discovering legal truth through hermeneutics rather than
experimentation. Hermeneutics involves discovering truth by interpreting texts rather than relating texts to reality, and by looking at abstractions rather than facts.21 2 In using a hermeneutic method, German legal
science focused on purely legal phenomena and values that promoted the
autonomy of the law.21 3 Social science theories and data were excluded.
Thus, German legal science was noteworthy in insulating itself from social problems. 2 14
In keeping with the tradition of German authoritarian liberalism as
well as German legal science, the German majority objected to abortion
206. See . MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 31-32.
207. J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 433,461 (1968); . MERRYMAN, upra note
71, at 31.
208. Rheinstein, The Approach to German Law, 34 IND. L.J. 546, 548-49 (1959); J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 32, 66. Cf F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 38.
209. Rheinstein, supra note 208, at 546, 550, 552; J. DAWSON, supranote 207, at 432-33; J.
MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 52, 68. See also F.-W. B6CKENF6RDF, supra note 41, at 18-19;
R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 34.
210. Rheinstein, supra note 208, at 548-49. See generally U. WESEL, supra note 198, at 92-

93.
211. . MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 67, 98-99.
212. R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 229-30; . MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 67-68.
See also L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 98-99.

213. . MERRYMAN, supranote 71, at 69. See also E.-W. B6CKENFbRDE, supra note 41, at
13, 16-17; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 46, at 251.
214. . MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 69, 153, 155. See also E.-W. BOCKENFORDE, supra
note 41, at 13, 16-17; R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 229.
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as a deplorable phenomenon of social life.215 The legislature, according
to the majority, failed to meet its constitutional duty to protect human

life.216 By countenancing the destruction of human life, the legislature
was merely promoting a social-political goal.217 When human life is at

stake, said the majority, social experimentation is not allowed. 2 18 Above

the realm of society and parliamentary tactics, however, stood an ideal
state embodied in an objective ordering of values,2 19 which the BVerfG

would enforce if the legislature did not.220 Thus, by requiring penal
sanctions to enforce a woman's obligation to carry a pregnancy to
term,22 1 the BVerfG was maintaining the moral and spiritual values of
the state.22 2 In addition, the BVerfG was teaching those values to the
populace2 23 and implicitly to the legislature.2 24 ]n short, the BVerfG
could express the moral and spiritual values of the state, which stood as a
model for politics and society.225
215. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVcrfGE 1, 45,
50-51, 55-56, 63-64, 66 (1975).
216. Id. at 51, 53-54, 59, 65.
217. Id. at 59, 67. One might note that the earliest predecessor to the law that the majority
struck down was a proposal by the SPD (the German Socialist Party) in the Weimar Republic,
see id. at 8, 13, (whose constitution, the majority notes, did not contain a right to life, id, at 36),
while the origins of penal sanctions against abortion, which the majority wanted to preserve,
was in Prussia. See id. at 7. One might also wonder whether the section in the majority on the
background to the case suggests that the Abortion Reform Act deserves less respect because It
resulted from political maneuverings culminating in compromise. See id. at 15-17. See also
Kommers, Abortion and Constitution, supra note 3, at 263.
218. 39 BVerfGE at 60. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.... It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to tile
rest of the country.").
219. See 39 BVerfGE at 41-42.
220. Id. at 51, 67.
221. Id. at 44, 50.
222. See id. at 42, 44, 46-47, 51, 57.
223. See id. at 44, 53, 57, 65, 66.
224. See id. at 51, 65-66.
225. Obviously the German dissent's belief that the legislature should accommodate political diversity and deal with moral uncertainty places it within the tradition of parliamentary
supremacy, of which German authoritarian liberalism is so critical. Three aspects of the dissent's view of parliamentary supremacy deserve highlighting. First, while acknowledging the
need of judicial review to protect defensive rights, id. at 70-71, the dissent stressed the need to
respect the value judgment made by the legislature in carrying out objective value decisions,
Id. at 72-73, 78-79, 80, 85, 90-91. This approach reflects the influence of the tradition of
parliamentary supremacy from the Weimar Republic, in which the Bill of Rights was
programmatic. That is to say, the Weimar Republic's Bill of Rights did not set forth rights
enforceable by courts but rather principles for the legislature to follow in passing laws, leaving
to the legislature itself the determination of how to follow these principles. See Graham, supra
note 27, at 497; Rommen, supra note 67, at 1; Rupp, The FederalConstitutionalCourt and the
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E. The German Judicial Tradition of Subordination
The contrast between the German majority's reasoning by synthesis
and the German dissent's reasoning by analysis can also be examined in
the context of the history of German courts. The two opinions reflected
different aspects of the German judicial tradition of subordination.
In deferring to legislative judgment, the German dissent followed in
the tradition of German courts' deferrence to higher authority," 6 first to
the prince or monarch, 2 27 and later to the legislature. 2 8 In stressing the
importance of a separation of powers, the dissent reflected the tradition
of German courts to address issues regarding the competencies of
branches of government but not substantive values.2 9
In reasoning by synthesis, the German majority adopted from the
German judicial tradition of subordination a style of obedience. Historically subordinate to higher authority, German judges typically have
craved authority, acted obediently, and needed certainty." 0 In presenting a hierarchically structured, internally coherent argument culminating
Constitution ofthe FederalRepublic of Germany, 16 ST. Louts U.L. REv. 359, 365 (1972); von
Mehren, supranote 85, at 72. Second, the dissent pointed to a weakness in the Basic Law itself
in cautioning against the constitutional procedure of abstract norm control - which allows
defeated legislative minorities to bring statutes to the BVerfG for review - from turning the
BVerfG into a political arbitration board that chooses between conflicting legislative proposals.
39 BVerfGE at 72 (1975). See also id. at 18; Kauper, supra note 14, at 1164. In pointing to a
weakness in the Basic Law, the dissent reflected the tradition of parliamentary supremacy,
which stresses the legislative source of law and views constitutional law as similar to legislation, von Mehren, supra note 85, at 71, 73, for both are created by people. Finally, the dissent
focused on the legislature's attention to the social problems surrounding abortion, including
those faced by the poor. 39 BVerfGE at 83-88. In so doing, the dissent upheld a law created
by the legislature, that part of Germany's political structure accessible to the widest range of
classes and views. See also R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 249; F. NEUMANN, supra note
46, at 46.
226. F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 44-45. See R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 187-88.
227. Rommen, supra note 67, at 2. See R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 187-88.
228. Rommen, supra note 67, at 2-3. Until the Basic Law of 1949, the power of judicial
review generally was not accepted in Germany, even during the Weimar Republic. Id. at 2-3,
5; Dietze, supra note 67, at 84-86; von Mehren, supra note 85, at 71-74.
229. Rommen, supra note 67, at 2; K. SCHLAICH, supra note 85, at 60-61. See R. UNGER,
supra note 46, at 217.
230. See R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 230; F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 44-45. In
an interview in the German magazine Der Spiegel in 1975, Judge Ernst Benda said: "The
[abortion] decision ...is a decision made by the constitution itself." Spiegel-Gesprdc:Karlsruhe-ein verkappter Gesetzgeber?,supra note 190, at 72 (Die Entscheidung... ist eine Entscheidung der Verfassung selber.") (author's trans.). The statement reflects the view of
German legal science that the judge is nothing more than the mouthpiece of general laws, Le.,
that a judge should not create law but only discover its content and apply it. See W. FRiEDMANN, supra note 46, at 211; NEUMANN, supra note 51, at 910, 912; F. NEUMANN, supra note
46, at 38.
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in an ethical absolute, the German majority asserted its authority with
certainty and expected obedience from both the legislature and pregnant
2 31

women.

The crucial difference between the German majority and the German judicial tradition of subordination is that the majority adopted a
style of obedience in order to assert its own authority. The majority's
assertion of its own authority can be explained both institutionally and
jurisprudentially. Institutionally, the BVerfG was a.new tribunal in German legal history: a high court with unquestioned powers of judicial
review.2 32 Jurisprudentially, the BVerfG could invoke a nontraditional
source of authority: the Basic Law.23 3 While German courts historically

23 4
have been bound by the positive laws of the monarch or legislature,
the majority exercised the relatively new powers of the BVerfG to interpret a relatively new constitutional law. In interpreting the rather vague
constitutional articles at stake-the promulgations of the right to life,

human dignity, and the free development of the personality2 3 -the

ma-

jority essentially asserted natural law. Natural law theory, which replaced legal positivism as the leading German legal theory after the
collapse of Nazism, 2 36 claimed that there are certain immutable human
rights which cannot be destroyed simply because people pronounce laws
contravening them. 237 The majority took precisely that approach: it
struck down a law purportedly to protect immutable human rights. 238 In

short, the majority stood the German judicial style of obedience on its
head under new circumstances: instead of obeying the authority of a

higher institution, the majority expected the obedience of others to the
231. See supra text accompanying notes 215-224.
232. Dietze, supra note 67, at 84; von Mehren, supra note 85, at 70, 74; K. SCUiLAIC11,
supra note 85, at 2, 8.
233. von Mehren, supra note 85, at 74.
234. Rommen, supra note 67, at 2-3; F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 45.
235. In the Der Spiegel interview in 1975, Judge Benda said in regard to the BVerfG's
reaching a different result on the abortion issue from the U.S. Supreme Court: "Our constitution is much more precise in regard to many things." Spiegel.Gesprdh: Karlsruhe-ehn
verkappter Gesetzgeber?,supra note 190, at 70-71 (author's trans.). Although that statement is
generally correct, see Kauper, supra note 14, at 1093; von Mehren, supra note 85, at 76, it Is
hard to see how it applies to the vague constitutional provisions at stake in the BVerfG's
abortion decision. Rather, the statement seems to reflect a judicial style, i.e., a traditional
understanding of what judges do despite new circumstances.
236. Dietze, supra note 67, at 74-75; Rommen, supra note 67, at 5; J. DAWSON, supra note
207, at 493.
237. Dietze, supra note 67, at 77-78, 84; Rommen, supra note 67, at 6-7.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31, 86-97. The majority understood the objective ordering of values in terms of natural law. See Rommen, supra note 67, at 9-10, 20-22.
See also Kauper, supra note 14, at 1102-03; J. DAWSON, supra note 207, at 493.
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authority that it found in a higher idea-an ethical absolute." 9 The formerly obedient son became the strict father.

One thing that ran against the grain of the majority, as well as German authoritarian liberalism and the German judicial tradition that it
reflected, was the very existence of a dissent. The role of judicial dissent
is by now so deeply ingrained in the United States constitutional tradition that its significance is all too easily overlooked. Traditionally, however, German courts announced one decision without any publicly
circulated dissent. 2" In West Germany, judges on courts other than the

BVerfG still are not allowed to write public dissents. Even public dissents from the BVerfG's majority opinion were not allowed until 1970.41
Not surprisingly, since then, dissents have been written for proportionately far fewer cases than for the United States Supreme Court. 42
The German majority's problem with dissent in general and the dissent from its opinion in particular was that reasoning by analysis undermined the authority of reasoning by synthesis. Without a dissent, the
BVerfG would be speaking with one voice, anonymously and impersonally,243 and its decision would carry more authority. 2' Such a situation

would meet the expectation of the majority, which presented its reason239. Cf. R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 234 ("Ifthe regime is democratic in tendency,
[German lawyers] do not hesitate to adduce natural law to remind it of its lack of authority; if
the authority of the state is absolute, lawyers become its obedient servants."); U. WESEL, supra
note 198, at 92, 108. What this paragraph further suggests is that in the majority, at least to
some extent, the new institution of the BVerfG takes the place once taken by the monarch as
the embodiment of the state. Thus, the interpretation of the majority presented above, see
supra text accompanying notes 89-103, is reminiscent of Hegel's concept of the state as a selfdifferentiated organism with the monarch synthesizing the differentiation of state functions in
the legislative and administrative branches. See L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 133-34. Cf.
Leibholz, The West German ConstitutionalCourt in FEDERALISME ET COURS SUPREiES Er
L'1NTEGRA-nON DES SYSTEMES JURIDiQuEs 61-62 (describing the BVerfG as the "Supreme
Guardian of the Constitution" because it is the institution with final binding force for both the
people and the state, deciding those legal disputes entrusted to it by the Basic Law and causing
it to serve the integration of the whole), 64, 67-69 (E. McWhinney & Pescatore eds. 1973).
240. McWhinney, JudicialRestraintand the West German ConstitutionalCourt, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 5, 7 (1961); Nadelmann, The JudicialDissent: Publicationv. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. Cost.
L. 415, 426-27 (1959).
241. R. LAMPRECHT & W. MALANOWSKI, RicHTER MACHEN POLmrK: AUFTRAG UND
AUSPRUCH DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, 17, 49 (1979); K. SCHLAICH, supra note 85,
at 31.
242. The persistence of the tradition of unanimous judicial decisions was illustrated by an
incident that took place when the BVerfG announced its abortion decision: between the readings of the majority and dissent, a justice from the majority walked out of the courtroom.
Zuchtmeisterfzir Bonn und Bzirger, DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 3, 1975, at 62.
243. See McWhinney, supra note 240, at 6-7; J. DAWSON, supra note 207, at 494; J. MErRYMAN, supra note 71, at 37.
244. See Nadelmann, supra note 240, at 427-28; J. DAWSON, supra note 207, at 499 n.65.
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ing as absolute, permanently valid, and not open to question. 2 45 The
existence of a dissent could only cast doubt on its assertions.
Characteristic of reasoning by analysis, the existence of the German
dissent implicitly challenged the German majority's authority by showing the legitimacy of political diversity and the unlikelihood of moral
certainty. The dissent responded to the majority's reasoning and asserted
its own arguments, thereby demonstrating the variety of possible ways to
resolve a single issue. Furthermore, the dissent's existence made clear
that a personal dimension exists in any judicial decision-making. 246 This
was illustrated most strikingly by the paragraph representing the views of
a single judge who, probably not coincidentally, was the sole woman
judge.2 4 7 Of course, the existence of a variety of arguments and personal
views suggested that judicial decisions are not certain and permanently
valid, but are subject to human fallibility and change.2 48
III. LEGAL REASONING BY SYNTHESIS OR
ANALYSIS: ROE V. WADE AND THE
GERMAN OPINIONS
A.

Reasoning by Analysis: Roe v. Wade

Despite the different legal postures of the abortion issues addressed
by the BVerfG and the United States Supreme Court, 24 9 Roe v. Wade
made several legal arguments remarkably similar to those made by the
German dissent. Like the dissent, Roe v. Wade analytically distinguished
among different stages of pregnancy,250 sources of law, and medical circumstances. The distinctions led to recognizing the legitimacy of reasons
for permitting abortions, in the German dissent indirectly and in Roe v.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 89-103, 117-119, 218-220.
246. Cf. J. DAWSON, supra notes 207, at 494; J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 37.
247. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 80-81.
For biographical information on Judge Rupp v.-Briinneck, see Spiegel-Gesprdch: Karlsruheein verkappter Gesetzgeber?, supra note 190, at 74.
248. Thus, the German dissent remarked that the development of appropriate constitutional judicial controls over social measures enacted to advance basic rights might well be one
of judicial doctrine's main tasks in the coming decades. 39 BVerfGE at 72.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
250. An analytical approach to a right to abortion is an answer to the "slippery slope"
argument against a right to abortion, i.e., to the question: Where can we draw the line in
killing human life if we start down this road and allow killing of fetuses? An answer is that we
can draw lines by being analytical and making distinctions. Thus, any type of killing must be
evaluated separately, and legalizing abortion has no inevitable consequences for legalizing any
killing of born persons.
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Wade directly."' They are characteristic of reasoning by analysis and
classical liberalism's commitments to political diversity and moral
uncertainty.
The holding in Roe v. Wade made distinctions among stages of pregnancy.2 52 It distinguished among the first trimester, when a woman has
an absolute right to abortion; 3 the second trimester, when the state may
regulate the abortion right to protect the health of the pregnant woman;2 54 and the third trimester, when the state may restrict the abortion
right to protect the potential life of the fetus, unless doing so would endanger the pregnant woman's life or health.25 5 Roe v. Wade arrived at
this tripartite division of pregnancy through three critical conclusions:
first, that the right of privacy extends to abortion; second, that the state
may not treat fetal life like born life; and third, that the health risks of
abortion are not what they once were.
Roe v. Wade's first conclusion leading to the tripartite division of
pregnancy was its holding that the right of privacy, as established in
Supreme Court precedent, extended to a pregnant woman's decision to
have an abortion." 6 The United States right of privacy is probably not
so different from the German right of free development of one's personality.2 57 Furthermore, the difference between Roe v. Wade's extending the
right of privacy to a pregnant woman's decision to have an abortion and
the German majority is probably not so great. The German majority did
not deny that the right of free development of one's personality extended
to a pregnant woman. 258 Rather, the difference between Roe v. Wade
and the German majority is that they drew different consequences from
251. The two dissents to Roe v. Wade objected to its reasoning by analysis as the basis for a
judicially created right, but apparently not as the basis for a legislatively passed law. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 ("Mhe conscious weighing of competing factors [in] the Court's
opinion... is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judicial one."), 174-77
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 222 ("This issue, for the most part, should be left with the
people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs.") (White,
J., dissenting). Thus both dissents indicated that a state legislature could legitimately reach
the conclusion that Roe v. Wade did. In short, the whole of Roe v. Wade--its majority opinion, concurrences, and dissents-manifested reasoning by analysis.
252. Id at 164.
253. Id. at 163, 164.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 163-65.
256. Id. at 152-53. See also id. at 168-70 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 209-15 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
257. See generally, Kauper, supra note 14, at 1112; Kommers, Liberty and Community,
supra note 3, at 377.
258. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1,42
(1975).
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the pregnant woman's rights. The reason the two opinions did so is that
they determined the value of the fetus differently, which leads to the second conclusion underlying Roe v. Wade's tripartite division of
pregnancy.
In regard to the state's interest in protecting fetal life, Roe v. Wade
looked at a variety of sources of law and found moral uncertainty about
how to value fetal life. Not unlike the German dissent's drawing upon
historical sources of law,25 9 Roe v. Wade made an historical survey of
different legal, philosophical, religious, and medical approaches toward
abortion. 2" Even after its conclusion of this historical survey, Roe v.
Wade continued to make references to historical positions. 2 61 Roe v.
Wade's historical references illustrated that the abortion issue gives rise
not to absolute and certain answers, 262 but to a range of legitimate viewpoints.263 This range indicated uncertainty about when human life begins since various legal systems, philosophies, and religions historically
have endowed the fetus with human value at different points during fetal
development. 2 " Based upon this, as well as scientific data, Roe v. Wade
quite simply doubted whether the time when life begins could be defined
precisely.2 6 5

As in the German dissent, 266 Roe v. Wade also looked to different
types of law, finding that the uncertainty about when life begins was reinforced by law that does not equate a fetus with a born person. Thus, the

United States Constitution does not-and logically could not-treat the
259. See supra text accompanying note 155.
260. 410 U.S. at 129-47.
261. Id. at 148-49, 151, 160-61.
262. Id. at 150, 159-60.
263. Id. at 159-60. Roe v. Wade linked diversity to historical inquiry at the beginning in
quoting Justice Holmes' words, "'[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views .... '" immediately after stating that it placed "some emphasis upon medical and
medical-legal history and what history reveals about man's attitudes towards the abortion procedure over the centuries." Id. at 117.
264. Roe v. Wade, id. at 113, referred to the belief that the fetus becomes human at conception, id. at 131, 160-61; at forty days after conception for a male, id. at 133 n.22, 134; at eighty
to ninety days after conception for a female, id. at 133 n.22, 134; at quickening, Id. at 132-33,
134, 136, 138, 160; at viability, id. at 131, 160; and at birth, id. at 160. Interestingly enough,
Roe v. Wade made no reference to implantation, which the German decision accepted as the
point when life begins. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfitssungsgericht, W. Ger., 39
BVerfGE 1, 14, 37 (1975). Roe v. Wade also discussed the closely related theme that historically penal sanctions have not always been imposed against abortion, 410 U.S. at 129, 130,
134-36, 140 n.37, and that when they have been, they have been imposed at different points
during fetal development, id. at 132, 138, 139, and with varying degrees of severity. Id. at 130,
134-35, 136, 138, 139.
265. Id. at 150, 159, 161. See also id. at 133 n.22, 217-18 (Douglas, J., concurring),
266. See supra text accompanying notes 154-156.
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fetus like a person.267 Furthermore, in circumstances not involving abortion, the law seems to accord only those rights to the fetus that are contingent upon live birth. 68
As a result of all of the above, Roe v. Wade, in contrast to the German opinions, found that the state may not adopt "one theory of life."269
If any overarching principle binds together the range of viewpoints and
uncertainty in Roe v. Wade, it is something like what Judge Rupp v.Briinneck suggested in her separate paragraph in the German dissent, 270
namely that the value of fetal life increases as pregnancy progresses because life's beginning involves a process of development. 271
Based upon this range of viewpoints and moral uncertainty, Roe v.

Wade took a crucial step not taken by the German dissent: it did not
accept the premise in the German opinions that the state must protect
fetal life. Roe v. Wade found instead that the state is allowed to value
fetal life only as potential life.272 Having taken this step, Roe v. Wade
could find - in direct contrast to the German decision 27" - that a woman's right to privacy must prevail over the state's interest in potential
life in the first trimester.27 4
267. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157-58 & n.54. In a perhaps related thought, the Supreme
Court noted the view that abortion has been banned for reasons having nothing to do with
protecting fetal life. Id. at 130, 148-51.
268. Id. at 161-62. This paragraph, which referred to areas other than criminal abortion to
find that "the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life... begins before live
birth... " id. at 161, might be contrasted with the paragraph in the German majority opinion
that looked to the definitions in the Criminal Code to find that abortion is killing. See 39
BVerfGE at 46. Whereas the German majority, in keeping with the concern for the aesthetic
coherence of the text, focused narrowly on only criminal law and the relevant code, Roe .
Wade cast its sights in a variety of directions to explore a variety of legal approaches. See also
id. at 217-18 (Douglas, J., concurring). The contrast between Roe v. Wades broad legal overview and the German majority's narrow focus on criminal law is reinforced by the fact that the
German majority ignored noncriminal German law, which parallels the U.S. noncriminal law
drawn upon by Roe v. Wade. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 161-62, with G. ROPKE,
supra note 41, at 140 Cm German civil law, such as the law of tort or of inheritance, the fectus's
rights are conditional upon live birth); id. at 53, 70. See also G. KRAIKE.R, supra note 174, at
56 (in interpreting the use of the phrase "every person" in the Basic Law's sentence, "[e]very
person has the right to life and bodily integrity," the German majority ignored the place where
the concept appears most often in German legal usage: section 1 of the German Civil Code,
which states: "Legal capacity as a person begins upon birth.").
269. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162.
270. 39 BVerfGE at 81.
271. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 133-34, 160-61, 162. See also Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778-79 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
272. 410 U.S. at 150, 159, 162.
273. See supra text accompanying note 100.
274. 410 U.S. at 153-54, 164.
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Roe v. Wade's third conclusion leading to a tripartite division of
pregnancy was its finding that the state's interest in protecting a pregnant
woman against abortion's medical risks largely had disappeared."' Advances in medicine made first trimester abortions as safe, if not safer,
than childbirth.27 6 In putting forth this argument, Roe v. Wade reasoned
by analysis in a way that had much in common with the German dissent.
Like the dissent,2 77 Roe v. Wade indicated that the legal approach to
abortion may legitimately change over time.2 7 Like the dissent, 279 Roe
v. Wade looked to data outside the legal discipline, although Roe v. Wade
put more stress on medical data.2 80 And like the dissent, 28 , Roe v. Wade
paid attention to the circumstances of a pregnant woman, although Roe
v. Wade put more stress on a woman's personal medical concerns.28 2
B.

Differences Between United States and West German
Constitutional Decision-Making

Roe v. Wade's reasoning by analysis can throw light on the German
majority's reasoning by synthesis in ways the German dissent cannot because, although both Roe v. Wade and the German dissent dispersed authority, they did so differently. The difference reflects the difference
between the liberalism of judicial review and parliamentary supremacy,
and, more particularly, the difference between United States and West
German constitutional decision-making.28 Although the liberalism of
judicial review, like that of parliamentary supremacy, disperses authority
through democratic procedures and institutions and a separation of powers, the liberalism of judicial review also disperses authority through the
judicial structure. In the United States, the liberalism of judicial review
disperses authority in four ways: first, through the appellate nature of
the Supreme Court; second, through the so-called case and controversy
requirement; third, through the doctrine of stare decisis; and fourth,
through federalism.2 84
275. Id. at 148-49, 151. The medical risks of abortion had been one of the reasons for

prohibiting abortion in the nineteenth century. Id.
276. Id. at 149, 151, 163. See also id. at 216-17 (Douglas, J., concurring).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 141, 248 and supra note 248.
278. 410 U.S. at 148-49.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 135, 144, 164-165.
280. Id. at 148-49, 151, 163.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 166-169.
282. Id. at 153. See also id. at 214-15 (Douglas, J., concurring).
283. The German dissent, in mentioning Roe v. Wade's holding, stated: "This goes too far
under German constitutional law." Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W.
Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 74-75 (1975).
284. These four ways of dispersing authority were referred to clearly at times in Roe V.
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First, the Supreme Court addresses constitutional issues only after a
dispersion of judicial decision-making has taken place, for the Supreme
Court acts essentially as an appellate court. In contrast, the BVerfG is a
court of original jurisdiction2 8 5 and acts only to resolve constitutional
issues.2" 6 Thus, the Supreme Court addresses constitutional issues only
after they have been addressed in a network of courts and refined as they
work their way through the judicial structure. In keeping with the
Supreme Court's appellate nature, Roe v. Wade considered the approach
of a range of lower court decisions on the abortion issue.28 7
The Supreme Court, as an appellate court, addresses constitutional
issues very differently from the BVerfG. The BVerfG uses, inter alia, a
procedure known as abstract norm control-the procedure by which the
abortion issue reached the BVerfG.2 88 In abstract norm control, the
BVerfG can decide upon a law's constitutionality immediately after its
enactment but before it takes effect. 2 89 The BVerfG maintains a monopoly of power in determining a law's constitutionality. 2 9° This is supposed
to avoid the uncertainty created by diverse decisions among lower courts
and preserve legal certainty and unity.2 9' Thus, the use of abstract norm
control to bring the abortion issue before the BVerfG and the absence of
attempts by lower courts to tackle constitutional issues associated with
abortion promoted the tendency of the German majority to treat constiWade, see infra notes 287,293,301-302,309, and, even when they were not, provided a general
setting for the opinion.
285. Kauper, supra note 14, at 1166; Rupp, supra note 225, at 362.
286. McWhinney, supra note 240, at 6; Rupp, supra note 225, at 362-63.
287. 410 U.S. at 154-56.
288. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerIGE 1, 18
(1975).
289. Kauper, supra note 14, at 1164 n.254; Rupp, supra note 225, at 363. There is also a
second type of norm control, known as "concrete norm control," by which the BVerfG passes
on the constitutionality of a statute referred to it by a state or federal court, but may not review
the case on its merits. Id. at 362-63. Since abstract norm control allows defeated members of
the legislature and other political organs to bring a law before it takes effect to the BVerfG for
its views, such norm control encourages the BVerfG to make an essentially political decision.
Kauper, supra note 14, at 1164, 1181. Thus, when the German dissent accused the German
majority of allowing the BVerfG to be used as a "political arbitration board," 39 BVerfGE at
72 (author's trans.), the dissent was accusing the majority not only of making a judicial decision with a political dimension, but also of acting like just another contestant in a political
struggle. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the majority to a large extent simply adopted the
position of those parties opposing the Abortion Reform Act. Compareid. at 35-68 (the reasoning of the German majority) with id. at 15, 20-23; G. KRAIKER, supra note 174, at 55-58. Of
course, this suggests that the majority's assertion of an ethical absolute above parliamentary
struggles, see supra text accompanying notes 215-224, was really only a smokescreen for its
own partisan position.
290. See K. SCHLAICH, supra note 85, at 63.
291. See id. at 74.
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tutional issues generally and abstractly.2 9 2

Second, the United States case and controversy requirement (which,
of course, was also applied in Roe v. Wade 293) disperses judicial authority
among a variety of cases. The case and controversy requirement provides that a United States court will decide only matters that are suitable
for a judicial resolution and that represent a concrete dispute between

two or more parties.294 Consequently, this requirement limits the
Supreme Court's decision of constitutional issues to those arising in the
context of actual individualized factual disputes. 295 The case and controversy requirement embodies a very different principle from abstract norm
control. In abstract norm control, the BVerfG can pass on a law's validity after its enactment but before it takes effect and, therefore, before
there is any individualized factual dispute. 296 Thus, abstract norm con-

trol separates pure constitutional issues from individualized factual disputes.2 97 Whereas the United States case and controversy requirement

tends to limit the breadth of any single constitutional decision and at
least leaves related constitutional issues open for later resolution, West
Germany's "norm control ' 298 encourages, as the German majority reflects, abstract answers to hypothetical issues.29 9
292. See supra text accompanying notes 89-108, 117-120.
293. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 123-29 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89
(1973).
294. See Singleton v. Wullf, 428 U.S. 106, 112-14 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S, 186

(1962).
295. Id.
296. See I. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 147-48. Cf. International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 223 (1954) ("Determination of the scope and
constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a
concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial
function.").
297. Kauper, supra note 14, at 1164; Rupp, supra note 225, at 362-63.
298. The BVerfG's norm control-whether the so-called "abstract norm control" or "concrete norm control," see supra text accompanying notes 288-289 and note 289-is always abstract to the extent the BVerfG's review always pertains to the constitutionality of a law and
never to the particulars of a case. See K. SCHLAICH, supra note 85, at 65-66. Cf. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 171-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for not adhering to
the case and controversy requirement, deciding "a hypothetical lawsuit," and formulating "a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied [citation omitted]").
299. In this regard, it is probably no coincidence that approximately fifteen Supreme Court
cases concerning abortion have followed Roe v. Wade, but not a single significant abortion
decision has followed the 1975 BVerfG decision. The only later BVerfG decision dealing with
abortion was essentially procedural, holding that an individual member of a public health
insurance program has no "standing" to sue to enjoin the program from reimbursing abortions
not subject to punishment pursuant to section 218 of the Criminal Code. Judgment of Apr. 18,
1984, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 67 BVerfGE 26 (1985). The contrast between the
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Third, in Supreme Court decision-making, dispersion of authority
through the grounding of cases in particular fact situations results not
only from the case and controversy requirement, but also from the common law doctrine of stare decisis. That doctrine disperses legal authority
through the various precedents of case law, applying the legal reasoning
of earlier cases to similar fact situations or extending such reasoning to
new fact situations. °" Thus, Roe v. Wade found that the constitutional
right to privacy applied to abortion by extending precedents applying
that right to aspects of marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. 0 1 Roe v. Wade distinguished
those precedents in allowing limitations on the abortion right in pregnancy's second and third trimesters.30 2 Stare decisis, however, is unknown under civil law.3" 3 The BVerfG, unlike the Supreme Court, issues
decisions with statutory force 3" and consequently is supposed to formulate (and extract from earlier decisions) general propositions. 5 In viewing issues independently of precedent, the BVerfG is more likely to
believe, as the German majority did, that legal principles should reflect
legal tradition, should not change in response to new fact situations, and
306
should be viewed as abstract and timeless.
Fourth, legal authority is more dispersed in the United States than
West Germany, since United States federalism leaves more power in the
hands of the states than does West German federalism. 3 7 Consequently,
United States courts must often determine whether an issue is a substantive one or one of competing sovereignties. 3°s Although Roe v. Wade
tendency of the Supreme Court to narrow issues and of the German majority to be comprehensive is illustrated by extending the comparison between the German majority and Roe . Wade
to the Supreme Court's subsequent line of abortion decisions. See infra notes 437, 440, 461,
524, 535, 551-552, 572.
300. See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 46, at 517; L MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 24, 34,
51.
301. 410 U.S. at 152-53. Accord id. at 168-70 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 211-13
(Douglas, ., concurring).
302. Id. at 159. In placing weight on distinctions between cases, stare decisis epitomizes
reasoning by analysis.
303. Kauper, supra note 14, at 1176; J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 37, 48.
304. Kauper, supranote 14, at 1168-69; Leibholz, supra note 239, at 57, 61-62; Rupp, supra
note 225, at 363. Since without a theory of stare decisis, the holding of one court, even a
higher one, generally does not bind other courts, J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 48, endowing BVerfG decisions with statutory force provides a functional equivalent of stare decisis.
Leibholz, supra note 239, at 57.
305. Kauper, supra note 14, at 1176-77.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 89-116.
307. Kauper, supra note 14, at 1141-42.
308. For example, the so-called "incorporation debate"-whether to incorporate the Bill of
Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment--concerned not only whether
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declined to leave the abortion issue to the states, one of the main points
of the dissents to Roe v. Wade was that the abortion issue is one properly
resolved by the states.30 9 A federalism dispute, like this one between the
Roe v. Wade majority and its dissents, did not emerge between the German majority and dissent. None of the BVerfG justices wished to avoid
addressing directly the abortion issue on federalism grounds, since they
all agreed that the Abortion Reform Act did not, as some state governments contended, require the approval of the Bundesrat, the upper house
of the West German parliament, which represents the states. 3 10 Not only
did the German majority lack an argument for dispersing authority on
federalism grounds, but also criminal law in West Germany is a function
of the national penal code, rather than primarily a state concern as in the
United States.3 ' Thus, because of the very nature of German criminal
law, the moral dimension inherent in criminal law was raised to a national level in the German majority. In the eyes of the majority, criminal
law must articulate the moral values of the state.3 ' 2
In summary, the absence from West German constitutional decision-making of these four factors present in United States constitutional
decision-making-the Supreme Court's appellate nature, the case and
controversy requirement, the docrine of stare decisis, and the importance
of federalism-illustrates why the majority discussed abortion on such a
theoretical level. West German constitutional principles do not emerge
through a series of decisions from a judicial structure addressing factually individualized cases. Rather, the BVerfG had to produce a first, full,
and final judgment. The result was a decision on a level of abstraction
characteristic of German legal science and German authoritarian
liberalism.
C.

The Meaning of Individual Rights

Reasoning by synthesis and analysis also helped to shape a crucial
concept in the abortion problem-the meaning of individual rights. Yet
at first glance an American lawyer might consider Roe v. Wade closer to
the German majority than the German dissent, since both Roe v. Wade
and the German majority tended to define rights in terms of separate
particular constitutional provisions are essential to due process, but also whether due process
should be the province of the federal government or the states.
309. 410 U.S. 113, 173-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
310. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 33-35
(1975). See also id. at 17-19, 24; Kauper, supra note 14, at 1153-54.
311. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 3 (1975) ("The German criminal law applies to acts
committed within the country.") (author's trans.).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 117-119, 221-224.
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individuals, while the German dissent treated individual rights as belonging not only to each individual separately, but also to individuals in aggregate.3 1 3 In contrast to the German dissent's wish to uphold a law
based on a theory of aggregating rights, both Roe v. Wade and the German majority struck down a law, and they both did so in order to protect
a right that belonged to an individual-in Roe v. Wade to the woman,3 14
in the German decision to the fetus. 3 15 The similarity between Roe v.
Wade and the German majority resulted from the tendency in both to
separate the state from society, as is characteristic of a court's purported
protection of individual rights.3 16 In contrast, the German dissent's aggregation of rights resulted from its tendency to merge society into the
3 17
state, as is characteristic of legislative enactment of rights.
On more careful consideration, however, Roe v. Wade and the German dissent were closer to each other in their view of individual rights
than either was to the German majority. What Roe v. Wade and the
German dissent had in common was confidence in society and individuals as members of society.3 13 This confidence in society went hand in
hand with reasoning by analysis, just as suspicion of it in the German
majority3 19 went hand in hand with reasoning by synthesis.
The German dissent's confidence in society is evidenced by its aggregation of rights. The dissent aggregated rights by considering the
group holding the same right and then asking what method might best
protect that right for the greatest number of individuals within that
group. While recognizing a right to life for every fetus,3 1 the dissent
also found that, during the first trimester of pregnancy, protecting the
right for some fetuses conflicts with protecting that same right for
others.3 2 1 More specifically, the rights of those fetuses best protected by
penal sanctions on abortion come into conflict with the rights of those
313. See infra text accompanying notes 320-326.
314. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); id. at 168-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
315. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 37,
42-43, 58, 65 (1975). The contrast between upholding and striking down a law, however, may
not be so important as the contrast between what underlay Roe v. Wades and the German
majority's striking down a law. While Roe v. Wade struck down a law as unconstitutional, the
German majority also instructed the legislature that it had an obligation to pass a law with
penal sanctions. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 117-119, 221.
316. 39 BVerfGE at 51, 65-67.
317. See id. at 69, 94.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 142-146, 166-174, and note 12.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 113, 117-119, 215-217.
320. 39 BVerfGE at 68.
321. Id. at 89.
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fetuses best protected by preventive counseling.322 The reason for this
result is that preventive counseling does not prevent a certain group of
pregnant women from having abortions, namely those who will not seek
counseling if by doing so they will compromise their freedom of choice
and potentially expose themselves to penal sanctions if they later decide
to have abortions.323 Because penal sanctions and preventive counseling
are to some extent mutually exclusive methods for protecting fetal life,
the imposition of either alternative means destroying the rights of those
fetuses better protected under the other alternative.32 4 The dissent would
have simply upheld the legislative determination of which alternative
would protect the rights of most fetuses.325 In short, the dissent treated
rights in the aggregate, making a probabilistic determination of the best
way to protect the same right for the greatest number entitled to it.326
The German dissent moved beyond balancing protection among
those who hold the same right to balancing a variety of rights or interests
among each other. Once the dissent recognized that balancing rights
within a group context produced no definitive solution, it became willing
to throw on the scale a variety of interests.3 27 The dissent, therefore,
concluded that the legislature legitimately may consider a range of perspectives. These perspectives include respect for a woman's self-responsibility and personality, the quality of a child's life, and the health risks of
illegal abortions. These perspectives also include the preservation of a
general legal consciousness that is not undermined by empty penal
threats oi their trivialized application.328
The German dissent's aggregation of rights was made possible by
two factors: the tradition of parliamentary supremacy and the West German constitutional procedure of norm control. First, the tradition of
parliamentary supremacy endowed the legislature with the power to protect the rights of the majority.3 2 9 In keeping with that tradition, the dis322. Id. at 88-89.
323. Id. at 89. The dissent also put this argument another way, namely that if preventive
counseling does not protect all fetal life, neither do penal sanctions. Id. at 88-89. Penal sanctions, which have failed to protect fetal life adequately in the past, id. at 87, work ambivalently,
driving some pregnant women into isolation and, in the resulting desperation, to have abortions. Id. at 88. See also id. at 56-57.
324. Id. at 88-89.
325. Id.
326. The dissent did not have to discuss balancing rights between the pregnant woman and
fetus if the mother's life was threatened since it was not disputed that a threat to the mother's
life was grounds for an abortion. See id. at 85.
327. Id. at 90..
328. Id. See also id. at 82-84.
329. See R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46,'at 13.
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sent found that the legislature could not realistically hope to advance the
individual rights of everyone. However, the legislature could advance the

individual rights of the greatest number.330 Second, norm control can
detach constitutional issues from the factual circumstances of any individual case.3 31 While this characteristic of norm control allowed the
German majority to tend toward abstractions, it allowed the German
dissent to address rights in terms of groups rather than separate

individuals.33
In the envisionment of rights, both Roe v. Wade and the German
dissent envisioned rights analytically and in terms of concrete individuals

within society, as is characteristic of classical liberalism.

333

Roe v. Wade

was analytical in addressing rights in terms of discrete individuals since

that approach involved a process of breaking down-that is, separating- individuals into independent entities. The German dissent was analytical in addressing rights in terms of aggregates since that approach
involved a process of breaking down groups and recombining individuals
into new groups. Furthermore, by analysis, both opinions viewed individual rights as in unavoidable conflict and resolved the conflict by balancing rights. The German dissent saw the rights of some fetuses as

conflicting with the rights of other fetuses and resolved the conflict by
trying to protect the greatest number possible.33 4 Roe v. Wade saw the

rights of fetuses335 as conflicting with the rights of pregnant women and

330. 39 BVerfGE at 88-89. Whereas the dissent found that the legislature could protect
the individual freedom of the greatest number, the majority found that protecting each fetal
life in and of itself promotes the common good. Id. at 58-59. The difference is between reasoning by analysis and by synthesis. Whereas the dissent's view rested on the assumption that
individual freedom can be separated from the common good, the majority's view rested on the
assumption that individual freedom and the common good are inseparable.
331. See supra note 298.
332. Whereas norm control facilitated the dissent's treating rights in terms of groups, Roe
v. Wade stressed a right to privacy-a right of discrete individuals. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973). See also id at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 211-15 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). This approach reflected both the tradition ofjudicial review, which stresses the
negative dimension of rights, Le., the freedom of each individual from state coercion, see supra
text accompanying notes 70-72 and note 52, and the case and controversy requirement, which
evaluates rights in terms of individual factual circumstances. See supra text accompanying
notes 293-299.
333. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
776-77 n.4 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Similarly, [Justice White's] statement that an
abortion decision should be subject to 'the will of the people,' [citation omitted] does not take
us very far in determining which people-the majorities in state legislatures or the individuals
confronted with unwanted pregnancies." (emphasis in original)).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 320-326.
335. In dealing with the conflict between the rights of fetuses and pregnant women, Roe v.
Wade, unlike the German majority, did not view the conflict as one between two constitution-
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resolved the conflict by trying to protect the conflicting rights according

to their changing weights over time. 336 Finally, both opinions envisioned
individual rights within the context of the actual circumstances of women in society who face the abortion problem.33 7

By envisioning individual rights analytically, both Roe v. Wade and
the German dissent were able to address an issue central to the abortion

problem under liberalism: When do individual rights begin? Roe v.
Wade and, to some extent, the German dissent suggested that human life
does not have one starting point, but is a gradual process of develop-

ment.338 Consequently, individual rights need not appear in full all at
39
once.

3

In contrast to the analytical societal approach to individual rights of
Roe v. Wade and the German dissent, the German majority, as charac-

teristic of German authoritarian liberalism, envisioned individual rights
in terms of an abstract individual. Thus, the majority found that upon
the appearance of a fetus certain crucial legal rights of an individual at-

tach.3" Rejecting distinctions characteristic of reasoning by analysis, the
majority denied any legal or moral significance to a fetus's biological deally based rights. While the woman's right to privacy is constitutionally based, the fetus's right
to potential life is not. Rather, under Roe v. Wade a state has the option of legislatively creating a right of the fetus, which would prevail over a woman's right to privacy at a particular
time, le., when the state's interest in protecting potential life may be recognized as compelling.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12, 252-255.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 164-166, 275-282.
338. Thus, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in resolving the conflict between a woman's
right to privacy and the state's interest in protecting fetal life, made clear that fetal life Is a
value worthy of consideration, id. at 150, 159, 162, that its value does not exist in full immediately upon its appearance, see id. at 131-34, 150, 159-62, and that its value is qualitatively
different from that of a born person. Id. at 157-58, 157-58 n.54. Consequently, the state's
interest in potential life may not prevail over a woman's right to privacy during pregnancy's
first trimester, le., during the fetus's early stages of development, see Id. at 153-54, 163-64, but
may do so upon viability, Le., during the fetus's late stages of development. See Id. at 163-64,
The German dissent did not focus on the point that the appearance of individual rights tracks
the gradual development of human life. In her separate paragraph, however, Judge Rupp v,Briinneck seems to have suggested that the issue of how to protect fetal life is another way of
stating the issue of when individual rights begin. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975,
Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 80-81 (1975). See also supra text accompa.
nying notes 161-163.
339. In his Der Spiegel interview in 1975, Judge Benda denied the importance of the issuo
of when human life begins, stating: "[ihe Supreme Court no more had to answer the question
than we did: When does life begin? It had only to answer the question, when from a constitutional point of view, does the legally protected realm begin." Sptegel-Gesprdch: Karlsruheein verkappter Gesetzgeber?,supra note 192, at 68, 70 (author's trans.). The statement is disingenuous since the two questions are inextricably linked. Indeed, the German majority drew
crucial conclusions from its certainty about when life begins. See supra text accompanying
notes 23-25, 27-32.
340. 39 BVerfGE at 37.
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velopment during pregnancy, or to birth (and the newborn infant's physical discreteness and independence). 3 4 ' The abstractness of the majority's
notion of individuality is highlighted by what the majority does not find
crucial for such individuality: consciousness," social relationships, or
activity. 43 In keeping with its desire for aesthetic coherence and symmetry, the majority found that human life and rights begin, immediately
and absolutely, at one precise point-implantation. 3 The majority implicitly juxtaposed life's precise beginning upon implantation to its disappearance at the moment of death.3 45

The German majority stressed the right of the abstract individual
with an absolutism that is foreign to United States constitutionalism in
general and Roe v. Wade in particular. 3 "1Whereas under Roe v. Wade a

pregnant woman's right to privacy prevails until another compelling
state interest narrows it,347 under the German majority the state may
never let a pregnant woman's right to privacy infringe upon the fetus's
341. Id. See also id. at 40, 43.
342. Id. at 37, 41.
343. Cf. generally R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 341-47 (discussing the relationship
between sociability and a fetus's developing personhood); G. ROPKE, supra note 41, at 123-35,
146-52.
344. 39 BVerfGE at 37. The German majority's approach toward the fetus is essentially
the same as Justice Whites. Thus, the German majority stated:
Life in the sense of the historical existence of a human individual exists according to
positive biological-physiological knowledge in any case fourteen days after conception (implantation, individuation) [citations omitted]. The developmental process
that then begins is a continuous process, which does not show any sharp turning
point and does not permit an exact division among various stages of the development
of human life.
Id. at 37 (author's trans.). Similarly, Justice White has written: "[O]ne must at least recognize, first, that the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells all the genetic information that
characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens ...and second, that there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child or, indeed, an adult human being." Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Cf. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 460-61 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Petchesky refers to this type of approach as "biological reductionism," which supplements or replaces the argument that a fetus is a person because it has a soul
with the argument that a fetus is a person because it has a genotype, thereby jumping from the
biological fact of genetic identity to the value of human personhood. R. PETCHESKY, Supra
note 69, at 334-38, 341.
345. See 39 BVerfGE at 36, 38.
346. In addition to the rest of the paragraph in the text, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
suggests at several points that it is exposing absolute or rigid views. See id. at 116, 131-32, 13436, 150. The contention (which several German law professors have made to me) that Roe .
Wade really is the opinion that is absolute confuses decision-making competence with absolutism. Roe v. Wade is not absolute as a result of the woman's right in pregnancy's first trimester
to decide to abort or the failure to shift any of the decision-making competence for the first
trimester to another authority, as the German majority does.
347. Id. at 154, 162-63, 164-65.
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right to life. Rather, the woman's right to privacy simply vanishes.34 '
Whereas in Roe v. Wade, the right to abortion emerged with the very
notion of its curtailment,3 49 in the German majority, the fetus's right to
life could countenance no limitation by the state.3 5 0 Whereas in Roe v.
Wade the right to abortion was similar but hardly superior to the preservation of other constitutional rights,3 5' in the German majority the right
of the abstract individual to life was the precondition for all rights, 352 a
virtual linchpin of the legal order. 353 Thus, in contrast to Roe v. Wade
(and the German dissent, for that matter), the German majority, in defining individual rights, could not deal with the possibility of conflict or
balancing among competing rights.
The distinction between reasoning by synthesis, as in the German
majority, and reasoning by analysis, as in the German dissent and Roe v.
Wade, is a distinction between authoritarian and democratic ways of
thinking. Whereas reasoning by synthesis leads to moral absolutes, reasoning by analysis accommodates conflict, debate, experimentation, and
a variety of pragmatic resolutions to moral issues. Thus, the German
majority, in theory at least, prohibited all abortions, while the German
dissent and Roe v. Wade allowed ever greater ranges of permissible
abortions.
Notwithstanding the distinction between authoritarian and democratic ways of thinking, each of the three abortion opinions was liberal.
Each was committed to some notion of the rule of law. Not surprisingly,
each opinion conceived of the rule of law differently. This Article now
turns to that theme.
IV.

A.

ARBITRARY POWER OR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM:
THE ROLE OF DISCRETION IN THE GERMAN
MAJORITY AND DISSENT
The Proper Balance Between Rules and Discretion

Whether within the tradition of German authoritarian liberalism,
classical liberalism of parliamentary supremacy or classical liberalism of
348. 39 BVerfGE at 42-43, 47, 66.
349. 410 U.S. at 150, 153, 154.
350. 39 BVerfGE at 36, 41-44. See also id. at 48-51; supia text accompanying notes 105107, 117-118.
351. See 410 U.S. at 152-53, 159.
352. See 39 BVerfGE 1, 36-37, 41-43, 46-48, 50-59, 67.
353. See generally id.
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judicial review, all three abortion opinions were committed to upholding
the rule of law. They recognized that the rule of law required the proper
balance between rules and discretion. Rules and discretion may have
several possible relationships. Rules, being impersonal, can ensure social
order through neutrality and fairness. 354 Discretion can represent individual freedom.355 Arbitrariness, whether attaching to rules or discretion, can upset the balance between the two. Arbitrariness attaches to
rules that represent limited interests 35 6 or are applied too strictly. 3 1 Arbitrariness attaches to the discretion of decision-making that is exercised
without moral restraint.35 8 Each of the opinions most clearly expressed
its view on what would upset or preserve the proper balance between
rules and discretion in terms of discretion, reaching different conclusions
on whether particular types of discretion posed the threats of arbitrary
power or deserved the protection of individual freedom. Needless to say,
the range of permissible abortion acceptable to each opinion was largely
a function of its views towards discretion.
In expressing its view on discretion, each of the abortion opinions
manifested its reasoning by synthesis or analysis. Under the influence of
German authoritarian liberalism, the German majority feared that arbitrary discretion in the hands of legislative authority or individuals would
threaten to subvert the rule of law. 35 9 Thus, the German majority
stressed that discretion must defer to the formal rule of law, whose abstract, impersonal, and neutral standards should restrain discretion.3 °
Under the influence of classical liberalism and reasoning by analysis,
the German dissent and Roe v. Wade viewed discretion favorably. Discretion is characteristic of freedom, whether of the freedom exercised by
legislatures, as the German dissent stressed,3 61 or the freedom exercised
by separate individuals, as Roe v. Wade stressed.3 62 The arbitrariness
these two opinions feared was not that of discretion but rather that of
rules. Rigid rules could arbitrarily curtail the proper realm of discretion.
354. See Neumann, supra note 51, at 908, 910; J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 50-51; PL
UNGER, supra note 46, at 69-70; R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 66-67, 68-69, 70, 71, 73, 84, 88-

89.
355. See Neumann, supra note 51, at 927; L UNGER, supra note 49, at 66, 69, 84.
356. See R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 53-54, 176-79; IL UNGER, supra note 49, at 64-65,
70, 73, 75.
357. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 50-51.

358.
359.
360.
178-79;
361.
362.

See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 46, at 422; R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 64, 66-67.
See infra text accompanying notes 369-371.
See Neumann, supra note 51, at 908, 910, 912-13; R. UNGER, upra note 46, at 69-70,
IL UNGER, supra note 49, at 68, 71, 73, 88-89.
See infra text accompanying notes 378-384.
See infra text accompanying notes 256, 314, 442-443, 447, 453.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol, I11

The two opinions especially feared the363potential arbitrariness of the
state's devising and enforcing penal law.
B. Discretion, Abortion, and Nazism

-

Before exploring in more detail the views of the three abortion opinions towards discretion, a short detour is appropriate to clarify the relationship between this theme and Nazism. In light of modem German
history, the two German opinions had no choice but to relate their respective views of discretion and, therefore, abortion, to Nazism. Nazism
represented evils that post-war Germany had to repudiate. In particular,
West German officials had to make clear that they understood that, as a
legal and political matter, a state should not kill innocent people. The
impact of the history of Nazi exterminations on the legal concept of protecting life, a concept included in West Germany's Basic Law, 3 64 might
be compared to the impact of slavery in the United States on the legal
concept of equal protection of law. As an abstract ideal, protection of life
no more depends upon a history of repressive, inhumane government
than equal protection of law depends upon a history of slavery and racial
discrimination. However, concepts of protecting life in Germany and
equal protection of law in the United States derived special meaning from
the particular historical background that gave them their specific constitutional forms. Thus, although in any liberal nation the abortion problem evokes the question of the origins of individuality and can stir up
concerns about destroying human life, in West Germany the abortion
problem raised those concerns in a nation that had recently shown how
the elementary principle against the killing of innocent people can be
ignored. This background suggests one underlying reason why the formal legal issue before the BVerfG was not in terms of a right to abortion,
as in the United States,365 but rather in terms of the best way to protect
human life.3 66

Although the German abortion opinions had no choice but to relate
their respective views of abortion to Nazism, the crucial point is that
each opinion's view of Nazism was a function of its view toward discretion, not the other way around. The German abortion opinions were not
363. See infra text accompanying notes 458-464.
364. Kauper, supra note 14, at 1114. See also Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfas.
sungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 36-40 (1975).
365. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
366. See 39 BVerfGE at 36, 68-69. In light of the history of slavery in the U.S., it should
not be surprising that in the U.S. one of the legal arguments against abortion characterized the
prohibition of abortion as involuntary servitude.
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reactions to Nazism but rather fit Nazism into their respective world
views. Each opinion found Nazism relevant to abortion to the extent
that the type of discretion it associated with abortion appeared in the
type of arbitrary power it found characteristic of Nazism. Thus, the German majority, which linked the discretion associated with abortion to
arbitrary power under Nazism, limited the range of permissible abortion,
while the German dissent, which distinguished the discretion associated
with abortion from the arbitrary power under Nazism, allowed a wider
range of permissible abortions.36
C. The German Majority's Fear of Discretion
Toward both the beginning and the end of its opinion, the German
majority made the general point that the destruction of human life under
the Nazis was wrong.36 In keeping with reasoning by synthesis, the majority generalized that point further and drew what it viewed as an obvious lesson from Nazism: the state's obligation to protect rather than
destroy human life requires the state to prohibit abortion.3 6 9 The Abortion Reform Act, passed in disregard of that lesson, aroused in the majority the fear of discretion in two places: in public power and private
will. (Both types of discretion might also have reminded the majority of
the evils of discretion, as practiced under Nazism.) As a public matter,
the majority feared an arbitrary exercise of power by the legislature in
passing the Abortion Reform Act. Characteristic of German authoritarian liberalism, the majority found that the legislature blatantly failed to
meet its clear constitutional duty of protecting life by permitting its destruction.3 7 ° As a private matter, the majority feared arbitrary acts of
will by pregnant women in having abortions as facilitated by the Abortion Reform Act. A woman's personal decision to abort, according to
the majority, represented her arbitrary power over the life and death of
the fetus.3 71 Thus, the woman's discretion was implicitly equivalent to
the Nazis' exercise of arbitrary power over life and death.
367. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Roe v. Wade, which provided the widest range of
permissible abortions, did not relate abortion to Nazism at all.
368. See 39 BverfGE at 36-37, 67.
369. See id at 41, 42, 47-48, 67.
370. Id. at 51, 53-54, 59, 65-66.
371. Id at 55-56. See also id. at 42-44, 50-51. One might also infer from the German
majority's paternalism, see infra text accompanying notes 500-508, that the majority also
feared a pregnant woman's choice to abort a pregnancy because it represented a woman's
control over her own reproduction. Indeed, one distinguishing characteristic of abortion as a
social phenomenon is that the woman takes control of reproduction in a technically simple and
completely effective way and neither needs the cooperation of men, nor is subject to their
power to veto it. See R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 29.
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Fearing these two types of discretion-the legislative exercise of
power and a pregnant woman's act of wil 7 2-the German majority

thought that discretion must be subject to restraints. These restraints
could be provided by requiring that political power be exercised in con-

formity with certain ideal standards, 373 or by requiring that acts of will
not infringe upon the freedom of others.37 4 Thus, the majority feared

that discretion not exercised within the bounds of the rule of law
threatened to suspend the rule of law.37 5
The German majority itself, however, tended to undermine the rule

of law. Its fear of arbitrariness and its view of rights as belonging to
abstract individuals combined with each other to impose a narrow classbased world view rooted in German authoritarian liberalism and, in particular, to impose a notion of individuality taken from German Idealism.
German Idealism set up the ideal of a cultured person who realizes freedom in the private sphere through intellectual and aesthetic contemplation independent of politics. 3 76 In keeping with that notion, the majority
believed that the pregnant woman's passively gaining insight into her
maternal obligations 377 must take precedence over two forms of activity:

first, over the woman's actively shaping her future: by deciding whether
to continue a pregnancy, and second, over the legislature's actively shaping the social order.
372. The majority seemed to have feared that these two types of potentially arbitrary discretion threatened to infect each other. Thus the arbitrary exercise of legislative power would
prompt arbitrary acts of pregnant women's wills, see 39 BVerfGE at 53-56, 58, and the wish of
some to permit such arbitrary acts of will may have occasioned the arbitrary exercise of legislative power in passing the Abortion Reform Act. See id. at 44, 65-67.
373. See id. at 42, 44, 46-47, 50, 51, 53, 57, 65-67. See also Neumann, supra note 51, at
912; F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 28, 31, 42, 89.
374. See 39 BVerfGE at 42-43,47, 66. See Neumann, supra note 51, at 912; F. NEUMANN,
supra note 46, at 28, 31, 42, 89.
375. Cf Neumann, supra note 51, at 912-14, 917, 919.
376. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 9-10; L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 167-68, 488-89;

F. STERN, supra note 182, at 7-9. The class basis of this notion lay largely in its reflection of
the thinking of the university-one of the two institutions in which the German civil servant
class (which largely gave rise to German authoritarian liberalism) was based, see supra text
accompanying notes 191-199. See H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 9-10; F. STERN, supra note
182, at 7-9. See also J. SHEEHAN, supra note 179, at 15, 19-21, 151, 234-35, 255. The German
majority's carrying forth of this class-based notion makes sense when one notes that BVerfG
judges may not engage in any other professional activities-except teach law at a German
university. See Rupp, supra note 225, at 360. Cf. R. LAMPRECHT & W. MALANOWSKI, supra
note 241, at 41 (on the disproportion of professional judges and bureaucrats as BVerfG
judges).
377. See 39 BVerfGE at 43-44, 48-50, 55-56, 61-62.
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The German Dissent's Acceptance of Discretion

In contrast to the German majority's belief that discretion by its
nature tends toward arbitrariness and abuse, the German dissent did not
fear discretion. The dissent believed that the Abortion Reform Act did
not exemplify either abuse of power by parliamentary government, or
unrestrained acts of will by pregnant women. Thus, the dissent did not
identify either kind of discretion with Nazism.
In regard to parliamentary government, the German dissent
thought that the Abortion Reform Act manifested the virtues of discretion. Implicit in the dissent's view that problems have a variety of solutions3 78 is the belief that the solutions devised must result from
discretion. 79 According to the dissent, only legislative discretion can resolve the uncertain task of best effectuating the objective ordering of values,3 8 ° realizing rights that come into conflict, 3 1 and providing the socioeconomic support needed to exercise rights. 38 2 The dissent stressed in
general that the legislature should represent conflicting views and resolve
them through compromise 3 3 (that is, by aggregating discretion). The
dissent further stressed in particular that the legislative process leading to
the Abortion Reform Act was a model of legislative responsibility. 3
The dissent was permeated by the conviction that the legislature canand here did-exercise moral judgment as effectively as judges.
In regard to a woman's decision to abort a pregnancy, the German
dissent thought that it had little to do with the evil of Nazism. The dissent analyzed the general point that Nazi destruction of human life was
wrong by distinguishing the specific historical ways in which the Nazis
showed disrespect for human life. This analysis led the dissent to conclude that Nazi destruction of life involved issues different from those at
stake in the abortion problem. The evil of Nazism, according to the dissent, was the state's organized and systematic extermination of innocent
people.38 5 The abortion issue before the BVerfG, however, did not involve extermination by the state, but rather the decision of pregnant women to have abortions without state involvement. 3 6 Thus, the dissent
implied that condemning the abuse of state power by the Nazis provides
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

See supra text accompanying notes 140, 142.
See 39 BVerfGE at 71-72, 83-84, 85, 88-89, 90.
See id. at 71-72.
See id at 88-89. Cf. Neumann, supra note 51, at 914.
See 39 BVerfGE at 83-84, 85, 90. Cf. F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 39.
39 BVerfGE at 71-72, 75, 84-85.
Id. at 82, 85, 88.
See id. at 76.
Id at 76, 80. The dissent also suggested that it would be better to have the pregnant
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little guidance in evaluating acts of private will by pregnant women to
have abortions. 3 7 Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that, as a matter

of historical fact, the very Nazis who exterminated innocent people pro388

hibited abortion, indeed, with increasingly severe penal sanctions.

Thus, the dissent found that the legal status of abortion under the Nazis
manifested Nazism's racist population politics, 38 9 which again reveals little about a pregnant woman's act of private will in having an abortion.
Although the German dissent distinguished the discretion pertain-

ing to Nazism from that pertaining to the abortion issue before the
BVerfG, the dissent could not escape the impact of Nazism on framing
the issue in the first place. The BVerfG's framing of the issue in terms of
how best to protect human life,390 coupled with the Bundestag's definition of human life as beginning upon implantation,39 1 limited the range
of arguments available to the dissent.
E. The Equitable Principle of Zumutbarkeit in the German Majority
Although preoccupied with the concern that discretion would undermine the rule of law, the German majority also recognized that the
woman make the abortion decision, as under the Abortion Reform Act, than to have state
involvement, as is implicit in an indications solution. See id. at 90.
387. Cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 932 n.70 (1978) ("[T]he familiar
slippery-slope argument ... that permissive abortion laws might lead to disregard for life
generally and then to inhumane disposal of the weak and old... deserve[s] a skeptical recption. Permissive abortion laws have not demonstrably led to an orgy of euthanasia or to enthusiasm for destroying the handicapped. Is it wholly irrelevant in this regard that Hitler's
Germany and Vichy France had among the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe?").
388. 39 BVerfGE at 76-77.
389. Id. See also id. at 9. To make the point that the legal status of abortion under the
Nazis manifested their racist population politics, the dissent really presented only half an argument. Not only did the Nazis make anti-abortion laws more severe soon after taking power in
1933, increase the number of convictions under those laws, establish a Central Agency for the
Struggle Against Homosexuality and Abortion in 1936, and pass it law in 1943 to allow abortion to be punished with death, but the Nazis also introduced a lay, in 1935 allowing abortions
for "defective" pregnancies on grounds of race hygiene, in 1938 allowed Jewish women to have
abortions, in 1940 by an official but secret decree granted to the State Health Offices permission to perform abortions on prostitutes, women of inferior character, and women of alien
race, and during World War II forced women from conquered and occupied territories to have
abortions for the sake of population control. See Bock, Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany:
Motherhood, Compulsory Sterilization, and the State, in WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY:
WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GERMANY 276, 283, 286 (R. Bridenthal, A. Grossman & M.
Kaplan eds. 1984). The German majority never answered or even addressed a question invariably raised by the preceding: if, as the majority believed, a lesson from Nazism is that abortion
must be prohibited, why is not part of that lesson that the prohibition must also cover abortions for eugenic reasons, which the Nazis permitted, as did the majority?
390. 39 BVerfGE at 68-69. See also id. at 70; supra text accompanying notes 23-25, 35-39,
391. Id. at 37. See also id. at 80.
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rule of law could coexist with some discretion. With this in mind, the
majority formulated a rationale for permitting exceptions to the prohibition of abortion. The majority was able to fit the exceptions into its
scheme of thinking by defining which of a pregnant woman's acts of will
in deciding to have an abortion could coexist with the rule of law. Carving out this realm of discretion for permissible abortions was no easy
task, of course, because a crucial element in the majority's hierarchy of
392
values was that abortion destroys life.
The German majority defined the exceptions to the prohibition of
abortion by invoking the principles of Zumutbarkeit.39 3 This principle
provides that an act cannot be punished if the person cannot be justly
expected to forego the act.394 What is crucial about Zumutbarkeit is that
it is an equitable principle. Equity provides an excuse from having to
follow a general rule in order to provide the flexibility to do justice in
individual cases. 395 Thus, for the German majority, Zumutbarkeit provides a pregnant woman with an excuse for having an abortion on the
grounds of justice.39 6 Consequently, the majority was able to link a pregnant woman's exercise of discretion in having an abortion to conscience
rather than arbitrary will.39 Abortion based on Zumutbarkeit, in the
majority's view, does not permit that type of act of will that leads to
abuse (and is associated with arbitrary political power), but rather promotes only that type of act of will that secures responsible private action.39 8 Furthermore, Zumutbarkeit gave the German majority a way to
allow women to have an abortion without implicating the state.
Although the state need not punish a woman who has an abortion as an
act of conscience, 399 the state still may not approve or support the act
392. Id at 43, 47-48.
393. Id. at 48-51.
394. In German law, Unzumutbarkeit (the opposite of Zumutbarkeit) excuses someone
from guilt for an unlawful act when law-abiding conduct could not be expected in face of
extraordinary personal circumstances. Eser, Justification and Excuse, 24 AM. 3. Co.NP. L
621, 636 n.79, 637, 637 n.88 (1976). The concept should be understood within the context of
the clear distinction made in German law, but not Anglo-American law, between the objective
justification of an act (which, although otherwise criminal, is deemed lawful because of its
justification) and the subjective, individual excuse of an actor (who has perpetrated a criminal
act but is not blameworthy and is, therefore, exculpated from some or all of its consequences).
Id. at 621-23. See also Ryn, Discussion of Structure and Theory, 24 AM. . CoMP. L 602, 60405 (1976).
395. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 51-52; R. UNGR, supra note 46, at 205.
396. See 39 BVerfGE at 49.
397. See id at 48-49.
398. See generally id.
399. Id. at 48-50.
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4°
and must continue actively to discourage it.
' In fact, the majority did
not state that such an abortion was not a crime, but only that it may be

deemed an act free of penal sanctions.40 '
From the German majority's point of view, however, a problem exists with any equitable principle, namely that it undermines general rules,
and the legal certainty accompanying them, through subjective moral

judgments." 2 Thus, although it had introduced the equitable principle
of Zumutbarkeit, the majority also wanted to limit its use. The particular principle of Zumutbarkeit has a flexibility that was a virtue for the
majority's purposes: by its reliance on conscience, the principle is largely

self-limiting. Acts of conscience do not threaten to undermine general
rules in the way that arbitrary acts of will do, for they justify action
contrary to the general rules only in unusual 4 3 cases and essentially only

by appealing to some moral principle. Thus, a woman's having an abortion for reasons of conscience does not undermine the general rule
prohibiting abortion since it happens rarely and for reasons that do not
threaten the validity of the reasons for prohibiting abortion in general. 4°
Furthermore-and this is implicit in the majority's approach even if
never explicitly stated-acts of conscience in the abortion context do not

threaten general rules in the way that the arbitrary exercise of political
power does because abortion is usually a private act without public repercussions. That is, such acts of conscience do not interfere with the state
morality that controls excesses in politics. 405 In fact, in allowing the
"full inner freedom to decide" when a woman suffers "severe inner conflicts,1'e Zumutbarkeitreflects the ideas of German Idealism

40 7 by

mov-

ing conflict from society to the internal realm of personality. 40 8 To the
400. Id. at 50.
401. Id. at 48-50. Although the majority used the word "balancing" once in its discussion
of Zumutbarkeit, id. at 48, the balancing is not of the fetus's right to life against the pregnant
woman's interest in determining which of the two should prevail. Rather, it is really the legislature's determination of whether the woman's constitutionally protectable interest is weighty
enough for the legislature to forego penal sanctions if the woman has an abortion. See id. at
48, 50. Cf Brugger, supra note 3, at 899 (discussing the majority's allowing some abortions as
balancing the rights of the fetus against those of the pregnant woman as a practical matter).
402. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 52 (1969); F. NEUMANN, supranote 46, at 34; R.
UNGER supra note 46, at 205; R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 142.
403. 39 BVerfGE at 48-49. See also E.-W. B6CKENF6RDE, supra note 41, at 276.
404. See generally 39 BVerfGE at 48, 50-51.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 187-190, 204-205.
406. 39 BVerfGE at 48-49.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 183-187.
408. See id at 50. In permitting those abortions that are acts of conscience, the effect, and
perhaps social purpose, of the majority might have been to create problems of conscience, I.e.,
to encourage guilt feelings among pregnant women considering abortions. Cf Thornburgh v.
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extent that acts of conscience are not just private acts but involve a political dimension, that dimension promotes state morality and the rule of

law by encouraging the state to withhold outside force whenever the individual must have the inner freedom to decide.4° 9 In other words, the

majority's exception for acts of conscience provides an individual with a
moral basis for resisting a general rule whose application under the particular circumstances would be unjust.
The Abortion Reform Act, in the majority's view, did not rely on
the principle of Zumutbarkeitto justify a limited number of exceptions to
the rule prohibiting abortions, but rather essentially permitted all abortions in the first three months of pregnancy." ' This threatened the entire
moral basis of the rule of law with collapse. In the majority's view, the
reasons justifying abortions that were permitted under the Abortion Reform Act extended beyond conscience to arbitrary acts of private will. 1
Thus, the majority found that the exceptions under the Abortion Reform
4 12
Act were not subject to clear limits.

The exceptions laid out in the majority, however, are not subject to
clear limits either. The majority's theory of exceptions based on
Zumutbarkeit is academically neat, as one might expect in light of the

majority's concern with the aesthetic coherence of the text. Nonetheless,
the majority never explained why the theory of Zumutbarkeit justified
exceptions on the basis of a woman's life and health, eugenics, ethics
(criminology), or social necessity. 4 13 Even if the definition, at least, of
the first three of these exceptions, seems straightforward, the definition of
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (a state's
message to pregnant women discouraging abortion "may serve only to confuse and punish her
and to heighten her anxiety. .. ."); R. PErCHESKY, supra note 69, at 365-66 (the gap between
certain notions of abstract morality condemning abortion and a woman's immediate circumstances leading her to consider abortion does not stop abortion so much as create problems of
conscience). See also Brugger, supra note 3, at 900-01 (praising the German majority for simultaneously maintaining a purely principled constitutional and moral condemnation of abortion as the destruction ofpotential life, and allowing the judgment of any abortion based on the
woman's concrete circumstances).
409. See 39 BVerfGE at 48-49. Cf E.-W. B6CKENFbRDE, supra note 41, at 267-68 (on the
legitimation of the state through its recognition of individual conscience).
410. 39 BVerfGE at 53-54.
411. Id. at 55-56. The German majority's objection to a woman's having an abortion as an
arbitrary act of private will is conceptually the same as Justice Whites transparent contempt
for a woman's having an abortion for "convenience"-a word Justice White uses four times in
his short dissent to Roe v. Wade. See 410 U.S. 113, 221-22 (1973). Arbitrary acts of will and
acts based on convenience are manifestations of the freedom of individuals in society to act
without state restraint.
412. 39 BVerfGE at 53-58.
413. See id. at 49-50.
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social necessity surely is not. Yet this exception is the most important
one since it defines the outer limits for permissible abortions. 4 14 Adopting the exception from the Abortion Reform Act itself, the majority rejected the Act's use of that exception to justify a three-month term
solution to the abortion problem and offered a new approach of its own:
the legislature must structure the exception based on social necessity congruently with the other exceptions. 4 15 The approach is, again, academi-

cally neat, but the majority left the meaning of congruence, that is, the
crucial issue of just how to apply the structure of the other exceptions to

4 16
the social exception, obscure.

Such a crucial omission reflects not only intellectual weakness, but
also the underlying dilemma in subjecting discretion to the rule of law.
4 17
General and abstract rules can never remove the element of discretion.

Furthermore, they can never make clear how to distinguish the arbitrary
exercise of discretion from the responsible act of conscience. 4 18 The Ger-

man majority, however, simply invited the legislature to try its hand at
the problematical task of distinguishing the arbitrary exercise of discretion from the responsible act of conscience, so long, that is, as abortion
remained restricted in principle within the guidelines that subjected political power and individual will to state morality. In short, the majority
did not place clear outer limits on the range of permissible abortion; it
stressed simply that there must be such limits.4 19
414. The German dissent pointed out that the social exception was crucial to the German
majority's own premises. The majority conceded that the previous legal circumstances did not
adequately protect fetal life because they were not differentiated enough. Since the previous
law recognized the medical, ethical, and eugenic exceptions, the truly new differentiation in the
Abortion Reform Act was the social exception. Id. at 87. The centrality of social reasons,
broadly defined, to the abortion problem was also stated at the opening of Justice White's
dissent to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 221: "At the heart of the controversy in these cases arc
those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger to the life or headth of the mother but are,
nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of reasons---convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc."
415. 39 BVerfGE at 50.
416. Cf. G. ROPKE, supra note 41, at 48-50.
417. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 51-52; F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 75, 77.
418. See F. NEUMANN, supra note 46, at 158-59.
419. In redrafting the Abortion Reform Act, the legislature was able to take advantage of
the German majority's treatment of the social exception to come up with a new law, passed in
1976, whose impact was less strict than the majority's theoretical framework. The majority did
accept the constitutionality of a social exception in principle, see 39 BVerfGE at 49-50, and the
revised law provided for one. 5 StrRG § 218a(l) & (2)3, 1976 BGBI1 1297. Tile majority
posed, as this Article argues, difficult if not impossible problems for defining a social exception,
and the revised law defined it simply by tracking the majority's general criteria on the matter,
Id. Although contrary to its general thrust, the majority included wording that can be construed to mean that the legislature could omit penal sanctions if, inter alia, nonpenal sanctions
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The Woman's Conscience in the German Dissent
The German dissent did not share the German majority's view that

the range of permissible abortions must be severely limited. While the
majority stressed that discretion often degenerates into arbitrariness and

abuse, but is sometimes necessary for equity, the dissent stressed that
discretion is often necessary for equity. Thus the dissent shared with the
majority the viewpoint that abortion is permissible in terms of equity,

that is, that abortion is permissible whenever a woman exercises her discretion to abort as an act of conscience rather than arbitrary will.
Whereas the German majority referred to a limited equity of excuse,
the German dissent referred to a broad equity of necessity. Equitable
principles, which alone provide the flexibility to do justice in individual

cases, 42 must be involved in almost all abortion cases, for the dissent
found that the decision to have an abortion regularly arises out of conflict
situations based upon a variety of individual circumstances.4 21 Further-

more, the dissent found that women normally do not make the decision
to have an abortion lightly. Rather, they make the decision only after
serious consideration, or, as the dissent put it, in the depths of their personalities. 4' Thus, by defining necessity broadly, the dissent essentially
found a conclusive presumption that a woman would decide to have an
abortion only if her conscience compelled her to do so. While equitable
principles are usually exceptions undermining general rules, 42 the dissent essentially turned a woman's equitable exercise of discretion in decould be just as effective, 39 BVerfGE at 51, and the revised law omitted penal sanctions
against a pregnant woman who has an abortion--so long as it takes place after the legally
required counseling and is performed by a doctor within twenty-two weeks after conceptionand also allowed a judge to.forego imposing penal sanctions if at the time of the abortion the
woman found herself in particular distress. 5 StrRG § 218(3), 1976 BGBI 1297. Thus the
legislature sidestepped the theoretical problem of defining the social exception concurrently
with the other exceptions and omitted penal sanctions apparently on grounds not unlike those
given in the German dissent. See infra text accompanying notes 135, 165, 168-169. Although
some German legal scholars have questioned the constitutionality of the revised law, its constitutionality has never been challenged before the BVerfG. For a detailed discussion of the
revised law, see Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experience, 34 AM. J. CON.,. L
369 (1986). To the extent that the German majority itself actually did allow the practice of
abortion out of harmony with its overall theoretical framework, this disharmony illustrates the
majority's commitment to the aesthetic coherence of the text and the autonomy of the law. See
supra text accompanying notes 104-116. The majority was committed to the coherence and
autonomy of its legal reasoning for its own sake, regardless of the social consequences.
420. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 51-52; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 205; R. UNGER,
supra note 49, at 142.
421. 39 BVerfGE at 83-84.
422. Id. at 88-89. See also id. at 90.
423. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 51-52; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 205.
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ciding whether to abort a pregnancy from an exception into the general
rule.
The German dissent justified its presumption that most women
would abort a pregnancy only as an act of conscience, not arbitrary will,
by putting abortion into a social context.424 A woman's deep internal
conflict on whether to abort a pregnancy, 425 according to the dissent, is
exacerbated by the social realities with which she is confronted.426 Thus,
the dissent found that each woman's individual decision is unique, not
only because pregnancy and abortion are inherently unique, 427 but also
because a variety of social and economic pressures surround almost all
decisions to abort a pregnancy.428 In short, the dissent implied that the
only way to assure fairness under so many different circumstances is
through equity: allowing free rein to the exercise of discretion and acts
of conscience. To do otherwise and apply a general rule prohibiting
abortion would run roughshod over a variety of social circumstances and
lead to injustice in countless individual cases.
As the preceding paragraph indicates, the German dissent, in contrast to the German majority, viewed conscience generously, finding its
presence as often among women as judges or state officials. In fact, any
failure of discretion, according to the dissent, lay less with women who
choose to have abortions than with a state and society that have failed to
address the social conditions that drive women to that alternative.429
The dissent reasoned further that imposing penal sanctions on abortion is
the state's alibi for deficient social assistance. 430 Far from reducing the
number of abortions, 431 penal sanctions simply divert attention from the
state's failure to provide social support systems that might have reduced
the need of women to have abortions.432 Without such social support a
woman's internal conflict is all the more exacerbated by social realities.433 In short, the dissent found that imposing penal sanctions on
abortion, as the majority required, is unjust because it projects onto women the failures of discretion of policy-makers in addressing the social
circumstances of pregnant women.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

See 39 BVerfGE at 81-82.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 83-84.
See supra text accompanying notes 125-129.
39 BVerfGE at 83-84.
See id. at 84.
Id. at 86. See also id. at 87-88.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 86-88.
See id. at 83-84.
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By allowing a woman the ultimate determination of whether to have
an abortion, the German dissent recognized what the German majority
did not: a general legal principle provides no insight into the nature of
any particular discretionary act and, therefore, offers no help in distinguishing an arbitrary act of will from a responsible act of conscience.
The alternatives to a pregnant woman's being the judge of her own conscience would be unacceptable. One such unacceptable alternative would
be to allow criminal trials after the fact to distinguish-implicitly arbitrarily-among women who aborted a pregnancy as an act of conscience
from those who aborted on other grounds.4 35 The dissent apparently
found that the danger of an application of the rule prohibiting abortion
outweighed the danger of a woman's abusing her discretion.436
The German dissent's granting such an important role to women's
acts of conscience did not mean that the dissent wanted the principle
prohibiting abortion to lose importance in the process of a woman's deciding whether to have an abortion. Rather, the dissent did not want that
principle to dictate a woman's final decision whether to have an abortion.4 37 The German majority objected to this approach as one permit434. See generally id. at 91, where the dissent noted that a material disadvantage of the
indications solution is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of finding an objective, unified criterion for the social indication. See also Neumann, supra note 51, at 913-14.
435. See 39 BVerfGE at 90. See also id. at 91; E.-W. BWCKENFORDE, supra note 41, at 27677. Another unacceptable alternative would be allowing the rule prohibiting abortion to preclude acts of conscience altogether.
436. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
781 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("In the final analysis, the holding in Roe v.Wade
presumes that it is far better to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to
deny all individuals the right to make decisions that have a profound effect upon their
destiny.").
437. See generally 39 BVerfGE at 85-86, 89. The underlying structure of the German dissent's reasoning here is similar to the underlying structure of reasoning in the Supreme Court's
abortion funding cases. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), which set forth the basic reasoning of the abortion funding cases, the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment does not require states that are participating in the Medicaid
program to fund nontherapeutic abortions for women in financial need, even if the state pays
for expenses incident to childbirth. The Supreme Court reasoned that the right to abortion
"protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by
the allocation of public funds." Id. at 474-75. The Supreme Court also stated: "The State may
have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision,
but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there." Id at 475.
Thus, while the German dissent reasoned that the state may omit penal sanctions for abortion
but must discourage abortion by other means (Le., counseling), Maher v. Roe reasoned that the
state must omit penal sanctions, but may encourage childbirth by other means (Le., funding).
See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (the Hyde Amendment limiting use of any
federal funds under the Medicaid program to reimburse the cost of abortions, including medi-
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ting abortion by creating a "rechtsfreien Raumes " 4 38 -a realm devoid of

law. The dissent, however, wanted to apply the principle prohibiting
abortion when it might be effective, namely in counseling centers where
women were supposed to seek assistance before aborting a pregnancy.4 39

Accordingly, the dissent would have upheld the Abortion Reform Act,
which directly applied the principle prohibiting abortion by imposing pe-

nal sanctions against women who failed to seek assistance at a counseling
center before aborting a pregnancy. 440 Thus, the dissent tried to strike a
delicate balance between a woman's conscience and enforcement of the
law against abortion - a balance that protected against arbitrariness,
assured fairness, and preserved the integrity of both conscience and law
enforcement. 44 1
cally necessary ones, does not violate any constitutional rights); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S, 438
(1977) (funding of nontherapeutic abortions is not a condition for a state's participation in the
Medicaid program); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (a city policy to provide publicly
financed hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions does not violate
any constitutional rights).
438. 39 BVerfGE at 44.
439. See id. at 85-86, 89.
440. See id. at 4, 5-6. See also id at 61-64. It is precisely at this point that the German
dissent diverges most sharply from Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court struck down laws that
require outside approval of abortion, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down a law
conditioning abortion on the approval of a hospital staff abortion committee), and later struck
down laws smacking of moral counseling. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (the states may not require that before an abortion a
woman be given various written materials and information to intimidate her into continuing a
pregnancy and to deter her from making the abortion decision in private consultation with her
physician, who is not an agent of the state); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (a state may not adopt regulations requiring a recitation of a lengthy and
inflexible list of information to a woman before an abortion, for the state may not try to Influence a woman's informed choice between abortion and childbirth, and may not intrude upon
the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician).
441. The next section will explore Roe v. Wade's confidence in discretion. Here, however,
it is appropriate to note that the reason why confidence in discretion led to an explicit right to
abortion in Roe v. Wade but not the German dissent may well have to do with the relationship
between equity and the judiciary in the United States and West Germany. Since the common
law tradition and its doctrine of stare decisis gives inherent equitable power to judges, see J.
MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 54, the Supreme Court was doctrinally amenable to evaluating
the abortion problem in terms ofjustice in individual cases. But the civil law tradition restricts
equitable power in the judiciary and gives it instead to the legislature. See W. FRIEDMANN,
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 46, at 517-18; J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 52, 54-55. Thus,

the German dissent was doctrinally predisposed to restrain itself from evaluating the justice in
individual cases independently of the legislature's evaluation. The dissent had to go no further
than to find that the legislature's Abortion Reform Act was just. See 39 BVerfGE at 71-72, 85,
87.
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ARBITRARY POWER OR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM:
THE ROLE OF DISCRETION IN ROE V. WADE
AND THE GERMAN OPINIONS

A. The Role of the Physician in Roe v. Wade and the German
Majority
Like the German dissent but unlike the German majority, Roe v.
Wade did not identify the danger of arbitrariness with individual discretion, but was concerned with fairness in individual cases. Roe v. Wade
expressed its trust in individual discretion by linking the right to abortion
to the doctor-patient relationship. According to Roe v. Wade, the right
to abortion resulted, inter alia, from the woman's right to have private
and confidential consultations with her doctor" 2 and the right of doctors
to practice their profession without state or other outside interference." 3
Although the German majority never denied that a doctor's practice of
medicine deserves protection, 4 " or that a woman's privacy includes medical care of her body," 5 it refused to derive from these interests a right to
abortion." 6 The reason why Roe v. Wade took that step but the German
majority did not was that Roe v. Wade viewed society as a realm of freedom, while the German majority viewed it as a realm of arbitrariness.
If Roe v. Wade trusted the discretion of a pregnant woman acting in
consultation with her doctor in society,' 7 the German majority, which
feared a pregnant woman's arbitrary act of will and a legislature's arbitrary exercise of power in society,"' also feared the social power of those
doctors who knew no bounds to their own business interests. 449 Whereas
Roe v. Wade expressed confidence that doctors generally have the knowledge, professional experience, and understanding to counsel pregnant
women,450 the German majority found that the Abortion Reform Act
442. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973). For convenience the text refers to Doe v.
Bolton as Roe v. Wade. This is appropriate since Doe v. Bolton was Roe v. Wade's companion
case, and as Roe v. Wade itself stated: "That opinion [Doe v. Bolton] and this one, of course,
are to be read together." 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973). See also id. at 163; id. at 219 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
443. 410 U.S. at 163, 165-66. See also id. at 164 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197, 199.
444. See generally Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39
BVerfGE 1, 62-64 (1975).
445. See generally id. at 42. See also id. at 48-49.
446. See generally id. at 42, 63-64.
447. 410 U.S. at 153, 163, 165-66. See also id. at 219-20 (Douglas, J., concurring); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 369-371.
449. See 39 BVerfGE at 63-64.
450. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 196-97.
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impermissibly allowed doctors to provide social counseling. The German majority reasoned that doctors lack the professional qualifications
and time4 -" to counsel pregant women. Furthermore, doctors might suf-

fer a conflict of interest between counseling a woman against abortion
and benefiting from the business of performing one.45 2 Whereas Roe V.
Wade felt sure that the professional ethics of doctors would provide one

43
moral guarantee for the responsible exercise of the right to abortion, 5

the German majority thought that precisely those doctors who are will-

ing to perform nonindicated abortions do so either for their own monetary gain or to assert women's rights and emancipation themselves.45 4 In
short, Roe v. Wade viewed doctors as a source of authority within society
455
who could advance freedom and should be protected from the state,

but the German majority was suspicious of medical discretion as potentially arbitrary and needing state control.45 6 Thus, the German majority

thought that freedom is advanced by the state, which controls discretion,
while Roe v. Wade thought that freedom is advanced by private professionals, who exercise discretion.45 7
451. 39 BVerfGE at 62.
452. Id. at 63. See also id. at 64. While the German majority found that the Abortion
Reform Act's counseling provisions were insufficient because the very physician who provided
counseling could perform the abortion, 39 BVerfGE at 64, Doe v. Bolton struck down a law
requiring that the performing physician's judgement be confirmed by the independent examination of the patient by two other licensed physicians. 410 U.S. at 199. Furthermore, the
majority, partly because of its mistrust of physicians, found the Abortion Reform Act's counseling provisions insufficient because no waiting period for reflection was required between
counseling and an abortion, see 39 BVerfGE at 64, while the Supreme Court, partly because of
its confidence in physicians, struck down an ordinance requiring a twenty-four-hour waiting
period between the time the pregnant woman signs a consent form and the abortion is performed. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 449-51 (1983). See
also Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 107 S. Ct. 267 (1987) (an equally divided Court affirming without
opinion the judgment below that a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period for minor pregnant women is unconstitutional).
453. 410 U.S. at 165-66; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 196-97, 199. See also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 153, 163; id. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 448 n.39 (1983) ("This Court's consistent recognition of the critical
role of the physician in the abortion procedure has been based on the model of the competent,
conscientious, and ethical physician.").
454. 39 BVerfGE at 63-64.
455. 410 U.S. at 163, 165-66; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197, 199.
456. See 39 BVerfGE at 44, 62-64. See also supra text accompanying notes 451-452.
457. In light of history this result is not surprising. Comparatively speaking, physicians in
the U.S. have been socially assertive, while physicians in Germany have been socially imitative,
Thus, in the late nineteenth century, physicians in the U.S. consolidated their professional
status by presenting themselves as agents of enlightenment and bearers of moral values, largely
on behalf of the state. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD 169-71 (1977). Cf. Id. at
97-100. Indeed, one vivid illustration of physicians asserting their moral role is the part they
played in criminalizing and objecting to abortion. L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S
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The Fear of Arbitrary Penal Law in Roe v. Wade
and the German Dissent

Roe v. Wade and the German dissent placed discretion in juxtaposition to the arbitrariness that both opinions feared: the arbitrariness in
penal law. The German dissent argued explicitly and Roe v. Wade implicitly that the issue in regard to punishing abortion must be whether
penal sanctions are permissible, not whether they are obligatory. 5 8 Both

opinions stressed that penal sanctions must be drafted narrowly because
they restrict freedom.45 9 The German dissent cautioned against penal
sanctions because of the dangers of abuse.' 0 Similarly, two concurrences to Roe v. Wade drew attention to the importance of protecting
against unwarranted government intrusion." 1 Both the German dissent
and another concurrence to Roe v. Wade warned of the danger of the
RIGHT: BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 59-60 (1977); R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 78-82.
See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 141-42. In contrast to their U.S. colleagues, German physicians at the time were securing their professional status by trying "to associate with the upper
echelons of society" and "to emulate the aristocracy and conform to ways of authority.....
Kater, ProfessionalizationandSocialization ofPhysiciansin Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany,
20 J. CONTEMp. HIST. 677, 678-80 (1985). Cf. G. KRAIKER, supra note 174, at 59. Paralleling
the assertive role of the U.S. physician and the imitative role of the German physician is the
fact that, while in the U.S. religion was largely supplemented by medicine as a source of authority, C. LASCH, supra note 457, at 169-71; R. PETCHEVSKY, supra note 69, at 71, 80, in
Germany religion was largely supplanted by the state as a source of authority. See H. HoLBORN, supra note 183, at 13-20; J. SHEEHAN, supra note 179, at 38, 41, 68-69; G. KRAiKER,
supra note 174, at 55-59 (describing how the position of the conservative German political
parties, CDU/CSU (the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Socialist Union), in
regard to abortion adopted and reformulated the position of the Catholic Church and to some
extent the Evangelical Church).
458. 39 BVerfGE at 69-70, 73-74.
459. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155, 164; id. at 211, 216 (Douglas, J., concurring); 39
BVerfGE at 70, 73-74. The German dissent cited Roe v. Wade, without providing page references, for the proposition that limits must be placed on the state's use of its penal powers. Id.
at 73-74.
460. 39 BVerfGE at 77. See also id. at 77-78.
461. 410 U.S. at 168-69 n.2, 169 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring). In not requiring governmental funding of abortions for the poor, the Supreme Court's
abortion funding cases explicitly highlighted the point that the abortion right protected a woman's freedom to terminate her pregnancy against the severity of criminal sanctions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1977). See
also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386-87 n.7 (1979). A reason for disallowing punishment of first trimester abortion, which neither Roe v. Wade nor the German dissent argued,
but which follows from the objection to unwarranted government intrusion in conjunction
with the concept that life is a process of development, see supra text accompanying notes 163,
264-265, 270-271, is the fear of the methods that the state would use to enforce effectively a
law criminalizing early pregnancy abortions, which can take place discreetly before anyone
else even knows that the woman is pregnant. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"); L. TRIBE, supra note 387, at 931 ("[S]erious enforce-
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uncertain implementation of penal sanctions that turn on the personal
discretion of experts, judges,4 62 or prosecutors.463 In a related point,
both the German dissent and Roe v. Wade were concerned about the
detriment to the individual who must await criminal prosecution for a
determination of an abortion's legality after the fact." 6 In the end, both
the German dissent and Roe v. Wade objected to the unnecessary imposition of penal sanctions - the German dissent by arguing to uphold as
constitutional an Abortion Reform Act free from that infirmity, Roe v.
Wade by striking down an abortion law infected with that infirmity.
In fearing the potential arbitrariness of penal law, Roe v. Wade and
the German dissent stood squarely within the tradition of classical liberalism, which aims at restricting penal law to lessen the danger that state
power will arbitrarily infringe upon individual freedom.4 65 What is striking here is that, although Roe v. Wade fell into the subtradition of judicial review in general, the dissent fell into it as well in regard to penal
law. The dissent believed that the legislature should make objective value
decisions and that the judiciary has expertise over defensive rights,
namely that sphere of individual freedom that must be protected against
arbitrary infringement by state power, especially in the area of penal
6
46

law.

In dealing with the judiciary's protection of individual freedom
against state power in the area of penal law, both Roe v. Wade and the
German dissent expressed a view toward society vis-A-vis the state that
facilitated their acceptance of a relatively wide range of permissible abortions. The two opinions perceived the greatest threat to individual free4 67
dom as coming from the state, not from third parties within society.
Thus, both Roe v. Wade and the German dissent stressed the need to
protect the pregnant woman from the state's potentially arbitrary enforcement of penal law, not the need to protect the fetus from the actions
of the pregnant woman. 468 This view of society and the state explains
why Roe v. Wade argued that the state may not restrict a woman's right
ment of a ban on abortions in the first few days of pregnancy was as unthinkable as enforcement of a ban on contraception itself.
462. 39 BVerfGE at 91.
463. 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
464. 39 BVerfGE at 90; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
465. See Neumann, supra note 51, at 901, 903, 915, 918.
466. 39 BVerfGE at 70-72. The German dissent seemingly was prone to circumscribe defensive-or negative-rights more narrowly than a U.S. court might have.
467. See id. at 74; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
468. See 39 BVerfGE at 79; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157-58 n.54; id. at 169 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 216 (Douglas, J.,
concurring),
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to abortion without a compelling state interest. 6 9 Similarly, it explains
why the German dissent understood the lesson of Nazism to concern the
protection of individuals from state tyranny, not, as in the abortion issue
before the BVerfG, the protection of fetuses from pregnant women.47
Of course, Roe v. Wade and the German dissent could not avoid
addressing the underlying point (arising out of suspicion toward society)
made by the German majority: the state must prohibit abortion for the
same reasons it prohibits homicide-because the state cannot tolerate a
society in which people are allowed to kill one another.47 " The response
of Roe v. Wade and the German dissent, in keeping with their reasoning
by analysis, was that abortion is not like homicide because pregnancy is
unique.4 72 Roe v. Wade argued that fetuses do not have the same value
as born humans.47 3 Roe v. Wade also pointed out that, as a legal matter,
fetuses have not been treated like born human life4 74 and abortion has
not been punished like homicide. 475 Placing less explicit stress on the
different valuation of fetal from born life,476 the German dissent argued
that abortion must be treated differently from homicide because, unlike
any other type of killing, the unique unity between the potential perpetrator and victim during pregnancy has two consequences. 4 77 First, it imposes burdens on the pregnant woman beyond simply forgoing an act.4 78
Second, it provides the best protection to the fetus from the pregnant
woman, who can be encouraged to sustain that protection most appropriately by means other than penal sanctions.4 79

The German majority had in common with both Roe v. Wade and
the German dissent the view that penal law separates the state from society. However, while Roe v. Wade and the German dissent feared arbitrariness in the state's use of penal laws, the German majority thought
that penal law performs a positive moral function of the state: teaching
the populace right from wrong. 480 On this point, the dissent responded
that in the case of abortion the problem with penal law acting as a moral
469. 410 U.S. at 153-54, 159, 162-65.
470. 39 BVerfGE at 76. Cf. id. at 42, 47.
471. See idL at 42-43, 47-48.
472. See generally supra text accompanying notes 124-129, 252-255, 262-265, 301-302.
473. See supra text accompanying notes 260-268.
474. 410 U.S. 113, 157-58, 157-58 n.54, 161-62 (1973); id. at 217-18 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also 39 BVerfGE at 78-79.
475. 410 U.S. at 130, 132, 134-36, 138-39, 140 n.37, 157-58 n.54. Cf. 39 BVerfGE at 45.46.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 161-162.
477. 39 BVerfGE at 79-80.
478. Id. at 79.
479. Id. at 79-80.

480. Id at 53, 57-58.
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teacher is its arbitrariness in practice.481 Prosecutions of abortions were
carried out irregularly at best, and punishment, when imposed, was
mild. 48 2 Thus, the punishment of abortion in practice bore little relation-

ship to the important theoretical role the majority gave to the idea of
such punishment. 8 s
The German majority, in turn, directed criticism at the German dis-

sent's acceptance of the elimination of penal sanctions for an act still
categorized as a crime. Eliminating the punishment for abortion altogether, according to the majority, eliminated the state's moral condemnation of that prohibited act. 48 a The dissent, of course, disagreed that
removing penal sanctions means approval,48 5 or that disapproval for its

own sake regardless of its effect is constitutionally mandated.48 6 However, as the comparison with Roe v. Wade suggests, the German dissent's
rationale for why abortion should not be subject to penal sanctions actually did much of the work for showing why abortion should be a right.
VI.
A.

THE ROLE OF EQUALITY

The Elitist View of Equality: The German Majority

In liberalism, the fear of arbitrariness is complemented by a commitment to equality before the law. Equality before the law requires that
legislatures pass general laws that treat people equally by not arbitrarily
discriminating. 4 7 Although all three abortion opinions focused on the
fear of arbitrariness by decision-makers more than in the law, the two
German opinions also expressed a commitment to equal laws. However,
their views towards equality and arbitrary discrimination were very different. The German majority conceived of an equality in the ideal realm
of the state. The German dissent conceived of an equality in the practi481. Id. at 82-83, 87-88, 90-91.
482. Id. at 82-83.
483. The German majority did not require the legislature to punish abortion like homicide,
id. at 45, but never explained why punishing the killing of a fetus differently from the killing of
a born person does not value fetal life differently from born life. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S
113, 130, 132, 134-36, 138-39, 140 n.37 (1973), which may be read to suggest that the types of
penal sanctions that historically have been imposed on abortion indicate that the value of fetal
life increases as pregnancy progresses.
484. 39 BVerfGE 53-54, 57-58. Some language in the majority could be construed to mean
that the legislature could, in theory at least, forego penal sanctions if an equally effective legal
sanction were available. See id. at 47, 51. The majority, however, never suggests how that
might be possible, but dwells exclusively on why it is not the case.
485. Id. at 92-93.
486. Id. at 93-94.
487. See Neumann, supra note 51, at 908-10; R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 66-69; W,
FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 422-24; R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 53-54.
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cal realm of society. Furthermore, these two different views on equality
paradoxically tended toward notions of inequality-albeit different
ones-that undermine the rule of law.
The German majority's notion of equality was inherent in its notion
of abstract individuality."' Abstract individuality includes a notion of
equality because individuality, according to the majority, begins with life
upon implantation, ends with death, and is of equal value from beginning
to end.489 Since all individuals are equal before the state, the state must
protect their lives with equal effectiveness before and after birth4 90 (even
if not always by the same means49 1). In other words, the state may not
arbitrarily discriminate against fetal life by protecting it less effectively
than other human life. Furthermore, whatever its practical coverage, the
penal law effectuating the protection of fetal life binds everyone
equally.4 92 In short, the majority was not concerned with practical

equality in society, but rather with abstract equality before the state regardless of social circumstances.
The majority's concern with abstract equality represented a notion
of formal equality-the principle that laws should be general and should
treat people as fundamentally equal, regardless of social position or economic inequalities.4 93 Formal equality does not inevitably lead to the

majority's abstract definition of individuality. The majority's notion of
formal equality, including its peculiar definition of abstract individuality,
reflected the thinking of the German bureaucracy, with its views of neutrality and universality, as well as of German legal scientists.
Under German authoritarian liberalism, the institution that protected the rule of law and thereby ensured the economic interests of the
German middle class was bureaucratic rather than democratic. 494 The
bureaucracy perceived itself as standing neutrally above political controversy and serving the universal public interest.495 In promoting the rule
of law in aid of centralizing a German state under the Prussian monarch,
the bureaucracy promoted neutral and universal rules. These rules, by
488. See supra text accompanying notes 340-345.
489. 39 BVerfGE at 37, 59. See also id. at 40.
490. See id. at 41, 42, 43. Cf id. at 79, 80-81.
491. Id. at 45-46.
492. Id. at 57.
493. See R. UNGER, supra note 49, at 151. See also Neumann, supra note 51, at 907-08,
910. The German majority's notion of formal equality is related to a religious notion of equality that everyone is equal before God regardless of social circumstances. See R. UNGtER, supra
note 46, at 79-80, 165; R_ UNGER, supra note 49, at 161.
494. R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 165, 178. See also . SHEEHAN, supra note 179, at 35-36.
495. R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 165-66, 179, 184-85.
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being general and systematic, provided the dependability and predictability needed for rational economic decision-making.496 Complementing the
bureaucracy's self-image of neutral service of universal interests, adherents of German legal science in the universities believed that jurists, not
legislators, manifested popular consciousness, and that they did so by
using historical sources of laws to formulate technical legal principles. 497
In keeping with this bureaucratic and legal scientific view of the rule of
law, the German majority presented its notion of formal equality as expressing universal interests and reflecting neutrality. In expressing universal interests, formal equality protects all citizens and human life,
including fetuses.49 8 In reflecting neutrality, formal equality leads rather

419
than follows the general consciousness of the law.
The bureaucracy and German legal scientists were elite groups. 50°
The notions that universal values were announced neutrally above political controversy by the bureaucracy itself and that law was revealed not
through democracy but through the legal scholarship of German legal
scientists reflected an elitist view.501 This was a hierarchical and therefore anti-egalitarian view. In a hierarchy, the position of people vis-a-vis
each other is not horizontal, in terms of equal social rights, but rather
vertical, in terms of dependencies, with obligations running to those
above and privileges prevailing over those below. 02 Although by advancing the economic interests of the German middle class, the bureaucracy liberated the middle class from hierarchy, it did so
economically.503 In serving the monarchy, idealizing the state, and depoliticizing the individual, the German civil servant class supported hierarchical and anti-egalitarian thinking about politics and society.5 °4 This
hierarchical and anti-egalitarian thinking left its imprint on the German
majority, for the majority's reasoning by synthesis, with its authoritarian
and anti-democratic aspects, is, in fact, a form of hierarchical thinking.
The German majority's notion of equality was closely linked to its
496. Id. at 184-87. See also L. KRIEGER, supra note 76, at 19-20; F. NEUMANN, supra note
46, at 40-43, 89, 202.
497. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 46, at 211; J. MERRYMAN, supra note 71, at 31-33, See
generally E.-W. BbCKENF6RDE, supra note 41, at 11-12; U. WESEL, JURISTISCHIP
WELTKUNDE: EINE EINFOHRUNG IN DAS RECHT 87-90 (1984).
498. See supra text accompanying notes 344-345.
499. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG)E 1,

44, 57-58, 65-67 (1975).
500. H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 11; J. SHEEHAN, supra note 179, at 20-21, 239,
501. See R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 190.

502. See id. at 170-73.
503. See Id. at 185-86.
504. See id.
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anti-egalitarian hierarchical thinking. The reason is that the most likely
consequences of equating all fetal life with born life are the requirement
that a pregnant woman carry a pregnancy to term and the view that a
pregnant woman's obligation to carry a pregnancy to term is natural.
Thus, the majority not only required a pregnant woman to carry a pregnancy to term, but also referred to "natural maternal obligations" s5" and
the importance of "reawakening the maternal will to protect the fetus
where it has been lost ..
."506 This reference to a pregnant woman's
natural maternal obligations to protect a fetus reflects hierarchical thinking. By referring to the pregnant woman's obligations as maternal, the
majority indicated that a pregnant woman has a proper role, namely as a
mother; in referring to those maternal obligations as natural, the majority derived from the natural phenomena of pregnancy the social role of a
parent; and in referring to the obligation in the first place, the majority
based a pregnant woman's "natural maternal" role on a dependency,
namely of the fetus on the pregnant woman.5 °7 Thus, in keeping with the
anti-egalitarian thinking of the German civil servant class, the majority

put hierarchical dependencies before equal social rights and treated those
dependencies as natural obligations rather than social conventions m8
505. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 56
(1975). See also id. at 49, 50.
506. Id. at 45.
507. The German majority's view of motherhood derives from an historically conservative
view of motherhood, which complements the world view of German authoritarian liberalism.
See supra text accompanying notes 177-205. For example, proponents of Mother's Day during
the Weimar Republic wanted to strengthen the will of women to strive for the ideal virtues of
motherhood and to raise the consciousness of women to their maternal responsibilities and
duties. The Mother's Day proponents wanted to do these things in order to reunite the community and nation against the divisive democratic party politics of Weimar and the disintegration and destructiveness caused by industrialization. Hausen, Mother's Day in the Weimar
Republic in WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY: WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GERmANY,
supra note 389, at 140-41.
508. In light of the German majority's views on hierarchy, nature, and society, one might
surmise that, for the majority, abortion represented doctors' artificial intrusion into and interruption of the natural process of pregnancy; one might further surmise that abortion represented the danger of the arbitrary power of those in society who would take control of nature
and thereby upset the balance in nature and hierarchy. These surmises would be in keeping
with the majority's previously discussed hermeneutic reasoning, as characteristic of German
legal science, which looked for answers in texts and purely legal phenomena and values, rather
than the experimentation underlying scientific inquiry and technological innovation. See supra
text accompanying notes 212-214. These surmises also deepen the contrast between the German majority's and Roe v. Wade's views on doctors. Roe v. Wade's positive view was partly
attributable to its confidence in medicine as a science that has positive effects in society. Thus,
Roe v. Wade stressed that only medical advances have made abortions safe and safe abortions
potentially easily available, 410 U.S. 113, 148-51, 163 (1973); id. at 216-17 (Douglas, J., concurring), and that medical knowledge has contributed to the doubt concerning when human

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. I I

In advancing German authoritarian liberalism's closely linked notions of formal equality and hierarchical inequality, the majority made
clear who might legitimately exercise discretion: the elite that could
carry forward such thinking into post-war Germany. On the one hand,
carrying forward this form of thinking was not surprising, since the civil
servant class continued to exist. Whatever else might have been "Westernized," or "Americanized," in post-Nazi Germany, both the bureaucracy and the university system remained intact, as did the structure and
training of the legal profession.50 9 On the other hand, carrying forward
the civil servant class's thinking was striking because of the new post-war
circumstances. The monarchy, which had provided the last political
model for hierarchical thinking, had disappeared in 1918 and was replaced, after 1949, by a new democracy. The German middle class,
which once had been weak and dependent upon the monarchy, became
strong and politically independent. 510
In light of these post-war circumstances, the German majority's perpetuating an authoritarian form of thought rooted in the civil servant
class is politically significant. 511 The majority tried to perpetuate hierarchical values by tying them to the new institution of the BVerfG, rather
than the demised monarchy. Although West Germany's constitutional
structure was largely shaped by classical liberalism, the Basic Law was
still open to interpretations shaped by German authoritarian liberalism.
While in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the German civil servant class developed German authoritarian liberalism in an attempt to
render freedom compatible with the institutional structure of the authoritarian state, in post-war Germany the majority tried to render the idea of
freedom of German authoritarian liberalism compatible with the institutional structure of West Germany's democracy.
life begins. Id. at 160-61. Thus, while the German majority seemed to view doctors' intrusion
into nature as potentially destructive, Roe v. Wade viewed doctors' control over nature as
progressive.
509.

V. BERGHAHN, MODERN GERMANY:

SOCIETY, ECONOMY AND POLITICS IN THE

TWENTIETH CENTURY 200-01 (1987); P. KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN WEST
GERMANY: THE GROWTH OF A SEMISOVEREIGN STATE 256-57 (1987),
510. See V. BERGHAHN, supra note 509, at 240-41, 252; L. EDINGER, POLITICS IN WEST
GERMANY 43-50 (1977).

511. The German majority's perpetuating an authoritarian form of thought rooted in the
civil servant class is also socially significant. The majority tried to perpetuate hierarchical
values by way of the family. With the collapse of other hierarchies in face of industrialization
and democratization, one of the best places for perpetuating hierarchical values might be the
family, for the family is too strong a social institution to crumble quickly and its dependency
relationships persist more tenaciously than others in modem industrial society.
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A Concern About Social Inequality: The German Dissent

The German dissent was concerned that equality before the state be
not only abstract, as the German majority stressed, but also real. That is,
the dissent was concerned, first, that the state should treat people equally
in fact and, second, that the state's treatment should affect people in society equally, largely by eliminating social inequality. The dissent feared
that striking down the Abortion Reform Act and reinstating the previous
law would undermine the values of equality.
The German dissent's commitment to the state's equal treatment of
people appeared in three places. First, the dissent explained that the fetus deserves equal treatment by the state.51 2 Thus, as a potential citizen,
the fetus must be protected like born persons against infringements from
the state, even if not from pregnant women.5 13 Second, the dissent found
that the social indication, or exception, to the prohibition against abortion is not amenable to definition by objective and uniform criteria. As a
result, the official interpretation of the social indication is prone to wide
variation depending upon region and the personal predilections of different judges and experts.5 1 The result would be legal inequality for the
women affected and the doctors involved.5 15
Finally, the dissent found that the state's prosecution under the previous abortion law, which became a matter of pure chance, resulted in
unequal and arbitrary treatment.51 6 Despite the high number of illegal
abortions, prosecutions were rare and convictions even rarer, and the
punishments imposed were usually monetary fines or probation.5 17 The
notion of equality contained in this criticism of chance prosecution is
highlighted in the context of West Germany's "legality principle." In
contrast to the principle of prosecutorial discretion in the United States,
the legality principle in West Germany is a rule of compulsory prosecution, forbidding the prosecutor the discretion not to prosecute when adequate incriminating evidence is available.51 8 The legality principle is one
512. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 79
(1975).
513. Id. Cf id. at 80-81.

514. Id. at 91.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 82-83. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 208 (1973) (Burger, CJ., concurring)
("In the face of a rigid and narrow statute... no one in these circumstances should be placed
in a posture of dependence on a prosecutorial policy or prosecutorial discretion.").
517. 39 BVerfGE at 82.
518. Hermann, The Role of Compulsory Prosecutionand the Scope of ProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. RaV. 468, 469 (1974); Langbein, ControllingProsecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHi. L. Rav. 439, 443, 448, 450 (1974). Here the dissent made

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. I I

of equality, for the prosecutor's duty to prosecute all legal transgressions
manifests the state's even-handed treatment of all people. 5 19
In expressing concern that the state had not treated people equally

in enforcing the old abortion law and could not treat people equally in
enforcing any indications abortion law, the German dissent was also ex-

pressing concern that such laws would have an unequal impact on the
access of different women to abortion. Such an unequal impact results
not only from unequal treatment by the state, but also from social inequality.. Thus, the dissent objected to the social inequality connected

with the commercial exploitation of women seeking illegal abortions:
wealthier women could more easily procure an abortion performed by a
doctor in a safe setting, often by going abroad. 520 The dissent also found

that economic and social circumstances are at the root of conflict situations leading a woman to decide to have an abortion.52 ' Women often
fear that the economic and social burdens of parenthood will fall upon
them alone.5 22 However, the dissent thought, the unfortunate results of

economic and social inequality cannot be prevented by punishing its victims, that is, the pregnant women driven to have abortions. Rather, the
inequality can be lessened and the reasons for the abortiqns removed only

by providing these women with effective social assistance. 523 Thus, the
dissent's concern with social inequality merged into its commitment to
freedom within a free social state. In a free social state social measures
effectuate basic rights, thereby advancing freedom and securing social
justice.524
clear the discretion it feared: that of state officials enforcing and applying criminal law without
subordination to the laws passed in the discretion of the legislators.
519. Hermann, supra note 518, at 470-72; Langbein, supra note 518, at 449; Schram, The
Obligation to Prosecute in West Germany, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 627, 630 (1969).
520. 39 BVerfGE at 83. Cf.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 120, 128; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,
455 n.1 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the uneven geographical distribution of abortion
providers disadvantages poor women).
521. 39 BVerfGE at 83.
522. Id. at 84.
523. Id. at 84, 86.
524. Id. at 71-72, 85, 87. The German dissent's theme that the state must take effcctive
social assistance measures to remove the effects of economic and social inequality also appears
in Justice Brennan's dissent in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In Harrisv. McRae the
Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which limited federal funds for abortions, even
medically necessary ones. In dissent, Justice Brennan made essentially the same argument as
the German dissent - if one ignores the fact that Justice Brennan assumed a right to abortion,
while the German dissent did not - namely that the state could influence a woman's decision
whether to have an abortion as much through social policy as penal sanctions. Thus Justice
Brennan wrote, "[Tihe discriminatory distribution of the benefits of governmental largesse can
discourage the exercise of fundamental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of
those rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions." Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the German dissent's notion of equality encompassed notions
of equal treatment by the state, equal effects of state law, and the state's
obligation to eliminate social inequality. In expecting the state to treat
fetuses equally to born people, 2 ' the dissent articulated a notion of formal equality not very different from the German majority's. In objecting
to the arbitrary enforcement of laws by random prosecutions,5 26 as well
as to the unequal application of law in different regions and by different
judges,5 27 the dissent expressed its notion of equality in terms of the legality principle and, thereby, parliamentary supremacy. The legality
principle is an aspect of parliamentary supremacy since it requires that
general laws passed by the legislature govern criminal prosecutions, not
the discretionary acts of state officials. 28 In objecting to social inequality
and expecting the state to counteract it, the dissent reflected the tradition
of social democracy. At this juncture, the dissent's notion of equality
merged into a notion of inequality, for getting rid of social inequality
requires the state to take positive action that treats people in different
situations differently. 29 In fact, this notion of inequality-a commitment to basic rights advanced by social measures to eliminate social inequality-is really another side of the dissent's view of an equity of
necessity broadly defined. 3 0 Equity mitigates the rigors of formal
53
equality '

C. Discounting the Equality Issue in Abortion: Roe v. Made
Roe v. Wade did not share the notion of equality in either German
opinion. In reasoning by analysis, Roe v. Wade rejected the German majority's notion that fetal life can be valued equally throughout pregnancy.
To the contrary, Roe v. Wade insisted that fetal life may be valued differently at different stages of pregnancy and must be valued differently from
born life.5 32 Like the German dissent, Roe v. Wade encouraged national
See also id. at 333 ("m[lt is not simply the woman's indigency that interferes with her freedom
of choice, but the combination of her own poverty and the Government's unequal subsidization of abortion and childbirth."). Cf. Neumann, supra note 51, at 930 (the application of
socio-economic sanctions are increasingly undermining personal rights).
525. 39 BVerfGE at 79.
526. Id. at 82-83.
527. Id. at 91.
528. Hermann, supra note 518, at 470.
529. Neumann, supra note 51, at 931; RL UNGER, supra note 46, at 81; PL UNGER, supra
note 49, at 175; U. WESEL, supra note 497, at 97.
530. See supra text accompanying notes 420-423.
531. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 46, at 195.
532. 410 U.S. 113, 154, 157-58, 157-58 n.54, 160-65 (1973). See also id. at 218 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
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uniformity in abortion law-by striking down the laws of all fifty states
and setting standards for all revised abortion laws. 33 However, unlike
the German dissent, Roe v. Wade was not overly concerned with social
equality. Roe v. Wade did not rely on a language of equality, nor did it
seem motivated by a concern about discriminatory prosecution 534 or the
impact of abortion laws on women of different social circumstances.
Quite simply, the holding in Roe v. Wade was not based in any way on
equal protection of the law.5 35 The principle underlying Roe v. Wade's
right to abortion is privacy. A positive notion of equality in Roe v. Wade
is hard to find.

D.

36

Inequality and Ideology: The Three Opinions

All three opinions reflected notions of inequality. The notions of
inequality reflected hierarchical thinking in the German majority, social

democratic thinking in the German dissent, and individualistic thinking
in Roe v. Wade. In terms of liberalism, the hierarchical thinking of the
German majority manifested a pre-liberal dimension; the social democratic thinking of the German dissent manifested a post-liberal dimen-

sion; and the individualistic thinking of Roe v. Wade manifested
liberalism par excellence. Furthermore, the respective notions of inequality show that each opinion included a class dimension. The German ma-

jority articulated the world view of a bureaucratic and academic civil
servant class;5 37 Roe v. Wade represented the world view of the middle
38
and upper classes by reflecting an ideology of medical professionalism;

778-79 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVerfGE 1, 80 (1975).
533. See 410 U.S. at 113, 139-40, 140 n.37. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200
(1973).
534. But cf. 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
535. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 200-01. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(the denial of Medicaid benefits for abortions, including medically necessary ones, does not
violate the equal protection of the laws even though its principal impact falls on the indigent);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (a state participating in the Medicaid program may pay
expenses incident to childbirth but not incident to nontherapeutic abortions without violating
the equal protection of the laws).
536. Why did Roe v. Wade not deal with the issue of equality belbre the law? Perhaps the
answer lay in the way Roe v. Wade dealt with the origin of individual rights. Concluding that
more and more rights may be associated with the fetus as it develops, but that the rights of a
person appear in full only upon birth, Roe v. Wade did not go on to discuss rights appearing
upon birth since the abortion problem as such disappears then. But it is upon the appearance
of a person with full rights that equal protection of the law comes into play. In a liberal state,
equal rights appear with individual rights.
537. See supra text accompanying notes 191-199, 206-224, 494-504.
538. See supra text accompanying notes 442-443, 447,450,453,455,457. Ofcourse, Roe v.
Wade should not be reduced to nothing more than a reflection of an ideology of medical pro-
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and the German dissent took into consideration the interests of the lower
classes.

53 9

The class-based dimension in each opinion is noteworthy because it
indicates how well each opinion lived up to the liberal promise that the
state should accommodate a range of views without discriminatorily advancing the interests of particular groups. In this regard, Roe v. Wade
and the German majority shared one class-related attitude toward equality: a disregard of social inequality, that is, an inattention to the needs of
the lower classes. In reflecting the ideology of the German civil servant
class, the majority reflected its weak social ethic, which disregarded the
social circumstances of lower classes. 5 ° In promoting an ideology of
professionalism and privacy, Roe v. Wade addressed the needs of members of the the middle and upper classes, who probably had their own
personal physicians, but not the needs of the lower classes, who probably
did not.5 41 This aspect of Roe v. Wade is confirmed by the Supreme
fessionalism, for, as a practical matter, the decision to have an abortion is the woman's, not the
physician's. While Roe v. Wade and later Supreme Court abortion cases never suggested that a
physician is ever required to perform an abortion, they also never suggested that a physician
may veto a woman's decision to have an abortion. However, the physician's role is much
greater when only "therapeutic" abortions are permitted, Le, when abortion is permitted only
if the woman's health, possibly including her mental or emotional health, is at stake. See
generally R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 289. Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62
(1971) (an abortion statute criminalizing abortion not necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life and health is not unconstitutionally vague since, in accord with general usage and
modem understanding, the word "health" in the statute includes psychological as well as
physical well-being); G. Kraiker,supra note 174, at 59-61 (in the early 1970s organized physicians in Germany supported permitting abortions only for reasons-medical or eugenic-that
fell within their professional competence). One might view the important role that the
Supreme Court has attributed to physicians in a woman's abortion decision as the Court's
attempt to legalize abortion without sacrificing the moral role that physicians gained partly
through their efforts during the late nineteenth century to criminalize abortion. See generally
supra notes 457, 461, 535.
539. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 173, 382, 428-433, 520-524 and note 225.
540. See H. HOLBORN, supra note 183, at 25-26; L KRiEGER, supra note 76, at 151-52.
See also U. WESEL, supra note 497, at 93-94. Of course, the German majority did accept in
theory the constitutionality of a social exception. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975,
Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger. 39 BVerfGE 1,50 (1975). However, although accepting a
social exception, the majority essentially provided no reasons for doing so. Furthermore, the
majority's overall legal reasoning reflected the thinking of another social class. Moreover, the
social exception, as an exception, seemed to address the possibility of a conflict of a particular
woman related to a peculiar social circumstance, rather than to acknowledge the general need
for abortions arising out of a widespread social condition. See generally id.
541. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 483 (1977) (Brennan, J.,dissenting) ("The stark
reality for too many ...indigent pregnant women is that indigency makes access to competent
licensed physicians not merely 'difficult' but 'impossible.' "). See also L GORDON, supra note
457, at 288; R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 131 ("For the majority of women did not and do
not have access to a cozy, confidential relationship with a private physician, traditionally the
ticket to a safe abortion."); id. at 156-61.
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Court's later decisions in the abortion funding cases, which essentially
secured the right to abortion only for those who could afford it.5 42 Thus,
the German dissent's criticism of the majority applies to Roe v. Wade as
well: the practical consequence of each opinion is -that the middle class
and rich, but not poor, would be assured effective access to safe abortion. 543 In contrast to the German majority and Roe v. Wade, the German dissent paid attention to the needs and values of the lower classes by
linking freedom to socio-economic conditions. 544
The opinions presented the views and interests of particular social
classes in a language of liberalism-that is, in a language expressing particular class-based views and interests that provide neutral standards for
everyone and represent the essence of freedom. The German majority
used a language of liberalism to articulate the views of a narrow, even
atavistic elite,5 45 Roe v. Wade to articulate the views of the middle and
upper classes whose interests have been historically advanced by liberalism, and the German dissent to articulate the views of the widest range
of classes, including but not limited to the lower classes.
E. Social Economic Climate: United States and 'West Germany
The abortion opinions were handed down in the mid-1970s after a
decade of social and political upheaval, including a war in Vietnam, student protest, demands by various groups for more rights, and criminal
law reforms. In defining different ranges of permissible abortion by using
different types of legal reasoning and by striking different balances between rules and discretion, each opinion tried to assure equilibrium and
stability in the face of such upheaval. In falling back upon German authoritarian liberalism of the German civil servant class, the German majority rejected such upheaval by asserting an ideology of unchanging
authority and a paternalism that would assure that the hierarchical fam542. See supra note 437.
543. This paragraph has suggested that Roe v. Wade and the German majority converge in
their practical effect on the pace of change in abortion law. Roe v. Wade gave an impetus to
change in U.S. abortion law, but was followed by some cases slowing the pace, see supra notes
437, 461, 524, 535, 552, while the German decision set restraints on change in West German
abortion law, but was followed by a redrafted abortion reform law that was still more liberal
than the prereform law. See supra note 419. Thus, Roe v. Wade might well have provided a
surge of energy that was quickly exhausted, while the German majority established boundaries
that were pushed to their limits.
544. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 173, 382, 428-433, 520-524 and note 225,
545. The narrow class basis of the German majority is highlighted if, as is my impression,
the range of views towards abortion in society as a whole is actually similar in the U.S. and
West Germany. Compare R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, with G. KRAIKER, supra note 174.
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ily would remain a model for political authority. 54 6 In turning to a classical liberalism of judicial review with an emphasis on medical
professionalism, Roe v. Wade strove for stability by setting forth a model
of health for what some had called a "sick" society. In turning to a
classical liberalism of parliamentary supremacy incorporating social democracy, which took into account the needs of the lower classes, the
German dissent aimed at preserving stability by encouraging new laws to
adjust to socio-economic change as it affects a wide range of people.
VII.
A.

CONCLUSION: SEARCHING FOR AN OPTIMAL
RIGHT TO ABORTION

The Nature of the Individual

The three abortion opinions defined different ranges of permissible
abortion because they held different views of freedom. These views of
freedom involved different complementary notions of the state and the
individual. Committed, at least in part, to liberalism, all three opinions
expressed the belief that the state must protect the individual. As with
perhaps no other issue, however, abortion poses the problem of how to
define the individual receiving the state's protection. The opinions found
the essence of individuality in either the fetus or the woman. They did so
by conceiving of the individual in terms of either theory or reality and of
either passivity or action. Thus, the German majority, within the tradition of German authoritarian liberalism, viewed the fetus, no matter
what its stage of development, as a person in theory, and viewed the
pregnant woman, usually regardless of her circumstances, as having to
accept her plight passively. Roe v. Wade and the German dissent, within
the tradition of classical liberalism, viewed the pregnant woman as shaping her own future actively and recognized reality as changing, whether
during a fetus's biological development or a society's development. The
different types of individuals protected by the state were complemented
by the type of liberal state providing the protection - by the theoretically moral state in the German majority, by the active state in the German dissent, and from the potentially dangerous state in Roe v. Wade.
B.

Autonomy and Alienation

In order to compare the three opinions, this Article has looked at
the nature of the state, the nature of the individual and individual rights,
546. Cf. Judgment of July 29, 1959, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 10 BVerfGE 59
(1959) (finding invalid the provision of the federal family law giving the husband and father
the ultimate power to decide matters concerning the control of children).
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and the extent to which the state may prohibit or permit abortion. It has
not focused on the link between individual rights in general and the right
to abortion in particular. Since the German opinions, especially the majority, defined abortion as a crime, different possible forms of a right to
abortion have not been compared. However, the German opinions' belief
in the state's responsibility to limit abortion need not prevent the continued use of a comparative perspective to inquire into the nature of a right
to abortion. Roe v. Wade does not exhaust the possibilities of a right to
abortion. Thus, one might ask whether and to what extent views towards freedom from either German opinion might be incorporated into
Roe v. Wade's right to abortion. More generally, one might ask what the
three opinions' different views towards liberal freedom might suggest for
securing an optimal right to abortion.
To determine how Roe v. Wade's right to abortion could be enhanced by views towards freedom contained in either German opinion,
one must first determine the limitations of Roe v. Wade. At its core, Roe
v. Wade's right to abortion is a right of privacy.5 47 Privacy is an ambiguous concept. On the one hand, it respects individual self-determination;
on the other hand, it ignores social isolation.5 48 Thus, in keeping with its
commitment to juristic freedom, Roe v. Wade appreciated the value of
individual autonomy.5 49 However, this appreciation was also a preoccupation that prevented Roe v. Wade from recognizing autonomy's negative flipside: alienation. Autonomy and alienation have the same basis in
society: the separateness of each individual from his or her surroundings
and from others. 5 0 In considering such separateness of individuals, Roe
v. Wade valued autonomy by respecting the independence of each woman from the state,5 5 but disregarded alienation by ignoring the poten547. See 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 159 (1973); id. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at
211-13 (Douglas, J., concurring).
548. See generally R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 3-4 ("While privacy .,. has a distinctly negative connotation that is exclusionary and asocial... it also has a positive sense that
roughly coincides with the notion of 'individual self-determination.' ").
549. See supra note 332 and text accompanying notes 256, 314, 333-337, 346-347.
550. See generally Neumann, supra note 51, at 903-04, 915; R. UNGER, supra note 49, at
25-26, 213-17, 226-29.

551. See generally 410 U.S. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("This right of privacy wits
called by Mr. Justice Brandeis the right 'to be let alone.' "). Roe v. Wade's preoccupation with
autonomy is reinforced, not undermined, by the Supreme Court's later abortion cases dealing
with the consent of or notice to parents of minors seeking abortions. In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court invalidated a parental consent requirement
as a condition for a minor's abortion. It did so on the grounds that "the State does not have
the authority to give to a third person an absolute and possibly arbitrary veto over the decision
of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy .... " Id. at 74. The
autonomy point is further reinforced in later cases, which evaluated parental consent or notifl-
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tial isolation of each woman from those around her in society. 552 In fact,
the Court's preoccupation with a woman's autonomy might have diverted attention from her alienation. Indeed, the abortion cases following
Roe v. Wade put the pregnant woman's right to choose to have an abortion without state interference side by side with a disregard of a pregnant

woman's need for social support from her surroundings.553 Thus, after
separating individual women into self-contained autonomous entities,

Roe v. Wade and later Supreme Court abortion cases left them isolated
and alienated, abandoned to tackle as best they could their plight in a
complicated society.
Neither of the two German opinions shared Roe v. Wade's refined
cation requirements largely in terms of whether the particular minor is mature, Le., whether
she could act autonomously. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating a statute permitting judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld even
from a minor found by the court to be mature and fully competent to make the abortion
decision independently); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (a statute requiring parental
notice-without allowing a parental veto-of a daughter's abortion decision does not violate
the constitutional rights of an immature dependent minor); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476 (1983) (a law requiring an immature minor to secure either parental or judicial
consent for an abortion is not unconstitutional); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (an ordinance making a blanket determination that all minors
under age fifteen are too immature to make an abortion decision or that an abortion never may
be in the minor's best interest without parental approval is unconstitutional because not reasonably susceptible of being construed to create an opportunity for case-by-case evaluation of
the maturity of pregnant minors).
552. The statement in the text is not contradicted by Roe v. Wade's statement that "[t]he
pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy," 410 U.S. at 159, since that isolation is
posited in contrast to the compelling state interests that might qualify the woman's abortion
right to privacy. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 8-12. See also Neumann, supra note
51, at 927-32. Roe v. Wade did try to overcome the alienation of a pregnant woman by linking
her right to abortion to her physician's right to practice medicine, Le., by encouraging private
consultation between the pregnant woman and her physician. See supra text accompanying
notes 442-443, 447, 450, 453, 455, 457. Furthermore, abortion cases following Roe v. MFade
tried to overcome the alienation of an immature minor pregnant woman by encouraging consultation with her parents. See supra note 551. However, as pointed out earlier, the notion of
private consultation between physician and patient is largely a middle-class myth that does not
apply to the poor. See supra text accompanying notes 541-542. On encouraging an immature
minor pregnant woman's consultation with her parents, Justice Marshall has argued that the
criminal justice machinery of the state is unlikely to resurrect parental authority that the parents themselves are unable to preserve. See ILL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 436-41, 445-54
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. Cf. L
TRIBE, supra note 387, at 988 ("Once the State... has 'liberated' the child-and the adultfrom the shackles of such intermediate groups as the family, what is to defend the individual
against the combined tyranny of the state and her own alienation?"). Of course, the Supreme
Court's general disregard of the problem of alienation in defining a right to abortion is not so
bad as the problem of alienation in illegal abortions. See generally L GORDON, supra note
457, at 52; R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 156.
553. See cases cited supra notes 437, 440, 461, 524, 535, 551.
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understanding of individual autonomy.5 54 However, each of the German
opinions expressed concern about the problem of alienation. They did so
by viewing freedom not just as an issue of separate isolated individuals,
but of individuals bonded to others within a commu:nity.55 5 The German
majority overcame alienation by positing a community of shared values.

In such a community, penal law protects elementary values55 6 and raises
the populace's consciousness of the law, 55 7 and counseling motivates
pregnant women to forego abortions.5 5 8 The state's protection of freedom by using penal law as a moral example for bettering social behavior
and values reflected an idealized view of the state and a negative view of
society. Rejecting that view, the German dissent fbund that legal consciousness and authority was undermined by empty penal threats. 5 9 For
the dissent, alienation is overcome not by penal threats, which keep pregnant women in the isolation that drives them to abortions in the first
place,5 "° but by helping pregnant women overcome their difficulties by
opening up contacts with their surroundings, namely by providing effective assistance. 561 In light of these two approaches to overcoming alienation, the question of whether and to what extent views on freedom from
either German opinion might be incorporated into Roe v. Wade's right to
abortion may be restated as the question of whether it is possible, or
desirable, to integrate either German opinion's views of alienation with
Roe v. Wade's view of autonomy.
554. Justice Stevens' statement that "[iut is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary
opinion of the sovereign ..... " Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring),
sparks the thought that the two German opinions shared a notion of privacy pertaining to
abortion to the extent that the abortions they permitted were removed from state involvement.
The German majority's theory of exceptions kept the state separatcd from any involvement in
abortion, see supra text accompanying notes 393-401, and the German dissent always would
have forbidden the state's participation in abortion. See supra text accompanying notes 512513. If the state's distancing itself from any act of abortion itself includes a notion of privacy,
that notion of privacy in the German opinions has nothing to do with the state's neutrality
toward a woman's decision to have an abortion, for both German opinions found that the state
must try to discourage a woman from having an abortion. See supra. It is the state's involvement in a woman's decision to have an abortion that the paragraph in the text addresses,
555. See generally Neumann, supra note 51, at 901, 927-32; R, UNGER, supra note 49, at
19-20, 22, 25-26, 213-17, 226-29.
556. Judgement of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 39 BVcrfGE 1, 46,
57 (1975).
557. Id. at 53-58, 66.
558. Id. at 61-64. On the Supreme Court's rejection of state counseling, seesupra note 440.
559. 39 BVerfGE at 83-84, 90.
560. Id. at 85-88.
561. Id. at 85-86, 87-88.
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The Weakness in the German Majority's View of Freedom

The German majority's view of freedom is incompatible with Roe v.
Wade's view. While both the German majority and Roe v. Wade separated the state from society, the German majority, which, unlike Roe v.
Wade, viewed the state positively and society negatively, dealt with social
alienation at the expense of individual autonomy. Whereas Roe v. Wade,
by locating freedom within society, recognized autonomy and ignored
alienation, the German majority, by locating freedom in the state, recognized alienation and denied autonomy.5 6 2 By locating freedom in the
state, the German majority placed only minimal weight on an individual
woman's personal values, practical realities, or moral responsibility. 63
The majority viewed a woman, in terms of both her control over her own
body and her political participation, as preferably passive, that is, nonautonomons. 5 4 Thus, the majority was able to recognize social alienation
only by distrusting society, removing freedom from it, and defining freedom as a characteristic of an ideal state. While denying autonomy, the
majority's proposed solution to alienation was a smoke screen: the bonds
the majority thought should hold a community together were simply imposed from above, reflecting the narrowly class-based values from an age
of hierarchy.565 As a substitute for the communal bonds that the majority wished were in society, the majority simply offered the fear of penal
sanctions.5 6 6
The German majority's view of freedom serves as a warning on the
562. For example, the German majority's view of motherhood as natural, see supra text
accompanying notes 505-508, denies a woman's autonomy. See generally R. PETcHEsIKY,
supra note 69, at 373 (referring to the denial of women's claims to individualism for the sake of
"a biological or spiritual determinism that relegates them to the realm of nature rather than
autonomous will."). One might also detect a denial of a woman's autonomy in the absence of
any exploration of the proportionality of a woman's act in aborting and the appropriate punishment. If abortion really is the taking of a full human life,
as the German majority insists,
why should not a woman, if she is autonomous, not be punished severely for the act?
563. 39 BVerfGE at 48-51. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 118, 348, 371-374,
505-508.
564. 39 BVerfGE at 48-51. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 118, 348, 371-374,
505-508.
565. The German majority's very use of the word "Gemeinschafi" for community, 39
BVerfGE at 46,48, 57, illustrates the influence of German authoritarian liberalism, for historically German conservatives used the word "Gemeinschaft" positively, and in contrast to the
negative connotations of the German word for society: "GesellSchaft." See R. DAHRENDORF,
supra note 46, at 120-22, 13; G. MossE, supra note 200, at 36, 121-22.
566. See 39 BVerfGE at 45-47, 55, 57, 65-66. See also RL UNGER, supra note 49, at 75. Cf
id. at 305 ("The idea that the disintegration of community makes fear the supreme social bond
occurs in the history of conservative attacks on liberalism."). For a viewpoint that finds that
the German majority reconciled liberty and community in a way that should serve as a model
for the Supreme Court, see Kommers, supra note 3, at 371.
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nature of attempts to overturn Roe v. Wade. The attacks on Roe v. Wade
in large part manifest authoritarian premises similar to the German majority's efforts to place morality in the state and its scorn of society.5 67
As in the German majority, the attacks on Roe v. Wade in large part
show no respect for the legitimacy of other viewpoints, show no understanding for the possibility of moral uncertainty, pay no attention to the
needs of a variety of women, and include no commitment to social
5 68
justice.
D. The Potential in the German Dissent's View of Freedom
In taking a positive view toward society, the German dissent had
more in common with Roe v. Wade than the German majority. The dissent's acceptance of a narrower range of permissible abortions than Roe
v. Wade allowed was, at least in part, an accident of the formal legal
posture of the issues presented to the BVerfG.5 69 Applying the dissent's
view towards freedom to a right to abortion suggests a more socially just
right than the right established by Roe v. Wade. The right, quite simply,
would be a broadly based one garnering state support. Its value would
emerge from the dissent's recognition that within society autonomy and
alienation exist side by side, and from the dissent's resulting attempt to
construct a notion of freedom that could preserve individual autonomy
while overcoming social alienation. 70 Such a notion of freedom would
have to protect individual autonomy, as in Roe v. Wade, and also build
the bonds of a community. The bonds of the community, however,
would not be the spiritual bonds reflecting the narrowly class-based values from an age of hierarchy, as in the German majority, but rather socially based bonds in a modern democratic welfare state.57 '
567. Although the authoritarian premises in the German majority and attacks on Roe Y.
Wade are similar, the historical origins of those authoritarian premises are not. The German
majority has origins in a hierachical past with no parallel in the United States.
568. Cf. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 242-52 (discussing anti-abortion views of the
New Right in the U.S.).
569. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25, 35-39, 175-176, 390-391.
570. See generally 39 BVerfGE at 85-88. The statement in the text is also supported by the
dissent's view of defensive rights being protected by the BVerfG and an objective ordering of
values being advanced by the legislature. See id. at 70-73. This view was an attempt to integrate the promotion of autonomy through defensive rights-reflecting a positive view of society with a negative view of the state-with a rejection of alienation through an objective
ordering of values-reflecting a positive view of both society and the state (insofar as the state,
through the legislature, becomes an organ of society).
571. In its views of defensive rights and the objective ordering of values, the dissent found,
like Roe v. Wade, that juristic freedom is a necessary condition of freedom. But the dissent
also found that, in the modem world, juristic freedom is not alone a sufficient condition of
freedom. See 39 BVerfGE at 70-73, 85-88. One might restate the dissent's view as follows: In
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However, applying the German dissent's view of freedom to a right

to abortion creates two problems. First, the dissent, like the majority,
viewed the state positively. Even though the dissent viewed the state as

an organ of society, while the majority viewed the state as above society,
any positive view of the state contains the danger of paternalism. The
dissent's paternalism was most pronounced in its favoring counseling of

pregnant women before abortions, 572 in contrast to Supreme Court cases

after Roe v. Wade rejecting state attempts to force women to undergo
counseling as an infringement on the woman's right to privacy. 573 The

dissent's favoring of state intervention through social welfare measures 74
was also paternalistic, perpetuating a tradition of state paternalism dating back to Bismarck. 57 5 Furthermore, the dissent's view of pregnant woaddition to juristic freedom, a precondition for freedom is protecting the material conditions of
existence;, the state is obligated to provide the tocio-economic support needed to sustain such
material preconditions for freedom; and the pace of socio-economic change in the modem
world has raised the material preconditions for freedom and, therefore, the obligations of the
state. See generally id. Cf. Neumann, supra note 51, at 918, 920, 927-31; W. FRIEDMANN,
supra note 46, at 411. The dissent's view, as made clear in this restatement, reflects the West
German idea of a free social state. See E.-W. B5CKENE3RDE, supra note 41, at 185-220, 23839, 244; Hiberle, supra note 45, at 43, 53-54, 57 n.53, 92-97.
572. 39 BVerfGE at 85-86. The paternalism in such counseling - which is, of course, yet
more pronounced in the German majority - is even more apparent when one remembers that
it applies exclusively to women, not men. From a comparative perspective, perhaps no better
illustration of the paternalism in the German opinions exists than that the counseling they
require of all pregnant women seems to resemble the type of parental advice the Supreme
Court has allowed only for immature minors. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981)
(a statute setting out a mere requirement of parental notice does not violate the constitutional
rights of an immature, dependent minor partly because "parents have an important 'guiding
role' to play in the upbringing of their children... which presumptively includes counseling
them on important decisions." [citations omitted]); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979)
("As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account
of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor."); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and
advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child.
That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped
to make it without mature advice and emotional support.").
573. See supra note 440.
574. 39 BVerfGE at 71-72, 84-88 (1975).
575. See R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 46, at 38, 59-60. One might wonder whether Germany's tradition of state social support partially explains why the German dissent did not take
the step to finding a right to abortion. With the realistic possibility that the state could, and
even would, provide pregnant women with a certain degree of social support; the dissent did
not have to argue that a right to abortion was necessary on the grounds that pregnant women
could expect no social support from the state. In the U.S., which does not have as highly
developed a tradition of state social support, the Supreme Court could not have reasoned that
a right to abortion is unnecessary because pregnant women could probably expect state assistance. See generallyR. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 103-06. Similarly, with the greater likeli-
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men contemplating abortions as victims of social circumstances might
include a tendency to neglect seeing such women as autonomous
agents
576
who want abortions to shape their own private destinies.
The second and greater problem in applying the German dissent's
view of freedom to a right to abortion, or more precisely, integrating it
into Roe v. Wade's right, is that the dissent justified a range of permissible abortions as set forth by a legislature. The dissent's view of freedom
was essentially democratic. Except for a limited range of defensive
rights, people develop freedom, in the dissent's view, through democratically elected legislatures, not courts.5 77 Thus, one may infer from the
dissent that individuals overcome alienation by actively participating in a
democratic state and forging political and social bonds.578 Roe v. Wade's
right to abortion, of course, was judicially created.
Thus, the German dissent suggests that one of the biggest problems
with Roe v. Wade's right to abortion is that it was created judicially. The
juristic freedom of Roe v. Wade-protecting rights against abuse of state
power-is a static rather than dynamic notion. 9 Furthermore, the the580
ory of stare decisis not only leaves issues open for later adjudicating,
but also limits the types of issues open for later adjudication. Thus, Roe v.
Wade, in serving as a precedent for later abortion cases, set the terms for
discussing the right to abortion, but left little room for discussing the
right in terms excluded from its approach. It is not surprising that after
Roe v. Wade gave impetus to change in United States abortion laws, later
cases have tended to secure the right without expanding it.581
Because it was judicially created, the Roe v. Wade right to abortion
cut short the development of a legal view of abortion, which is crucial for
a liberal right, namely the view of abortion as a right required by women's equality before the law. As stated in the Introduction, the problem
of abortion raises for liberalism this issue: When in the process of human
development does an individual appear who is guaranteed equal treatment under the rule of law? 82 Abortion also raises for liberalism this
hood in West Germany that a right would lead to positive state support, the German dissent as
well as the German majority might have been less prone even to think of abortion as a right, In
the U.S., finding a right to abortion did not invariably lead to state support for exercising it, as
proven by the abortion funding cases. See supra notes 437, 461, 524, 535.
576. Cf generally R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 126.
577. See 39 BVerfGE at 70-73.
578. Cf Neumann, supra note 51, at 918, 920, 927-31.
579. See Neumann, supra note 51, at 918.
580. See supra text accompanying note 300.
581. See supra notes 437, 440, 461, 524, 535, 551-552, 572.
582. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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issue: What is the equality guaranteed all individuals under the rule of
law when applied to pregnant women? If the ideal of equality is to extend fully to women, then pregnancy-a condition unique to womenmay not be allowed to put women at any disadvantages vis-a-vis men.
The German dissent seemed to recognize how crucial this issue is when it
noted that the state and society have yet to develop arrangements adequate to facilitate a woman's combining motherhood and family life with
equal opportunity for personal fulfillment and a professional career.5 s3
E. The Liberal Dilemma of Power and Freedom
In Roe v. Wade and its progeny, the right to abortion appeared in
the form of isolated autonomy, to be used as one wished, if one could. It
may well be that an optimal right to abortion does not exist since the
liberal dilemma of power and freedom is indeed unresolvable. However,
it is a sorry sign of the times that discussion of that right in the United
States has been framed by a right-wing attack with authoritarian premises, reminiscent of the German majority. Discussion of the right to
abortion in terms suggested by the German dissent, that is, of how to
build a more socially fair future, has disappeared. Although those who
support a right to abortion must now fear that the Supreme Court will do
away with Roe v. Wade, people could then fight through state legislatures
to regain a right to abortion, actively shaping it with consideration for
social justice and equality.

583. 39 BVerfGE at 84. To elaborate, under the rule of law the law's predictability provides a basis for calculating behavior. Neumann, supra note 51, at 909-10. Abortion, as a
back-up for failed or neglected birth control, allows women to control their reproduction with
certainty. See R. PETCHESKY, supra note 69, at 29, 189-90. Thus, a right to abortion is necessary if women are to be able to plan their lives and careers rationally, without unwanted random interruption.

